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collaboration on parts of this dissertation. The hospitality and valuable suggestions
from staff at research stays with the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Central Bank of
Ireland are also greatly appreciated, as are comments received from participants at
various conferences. Time and discussions — some academic, some less so — shared
over lunches and coffee breaks with Katrin Peters, Gilbert Spiegel, Sebastian Stoll,
Michael Zabel and many others did a tremendous lot to brighten up some of the
darker days and genuinely made those past few years worth their while.
My deepest thanks, however, go to my parents for their constant encouragement and
support in every way, shape and form, without which this dissertation would not
have been possible.
Benjamin Böninghausen
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Preface
Globalisation is arguably among the most significant developments in the economic
history of the world of the past half-century. In addition to a remarkable rise in the
exchange of goods and services across borders, this period witnessed the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973 and the concomitant
abolition of capital controls by the major economies, which ushered in a new wave of
financial globalisation (Mundell, 2000). The ensuing decades saw a large number of
developed and emerging market economies follow suit in lifting capital account and
other restrictions to investing overseas, thus contributing to an enormous increase
in the level of foreign assets and liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003, 2007).
Today, international financial integration stands at a level unprecedented in recent
history.
At the same time, financial globalisation has stirred much and often fierce debate
among economists, and eminent people in the profession have had long-standing
disagreements over its costs and benefits (see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2007).
Indeed, there was no shortage of events to rekindle the argument between the
advocates and those more sceptical of financial globalisation. The 1990s, for instance,
had their Mexican crisis of 1994, the 1997/98 Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian
financial crisis that in its wake brought down the LTCM hedge fund — which was
then bailed out by the United States to prevent ripple effects from spreading across
the entire financial system. This accumulation of crises led perhaps the most vocal
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critic, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, to conclude that “when there is a single accident
on a highway, one suspects that the driver’s attention may have lapsed. But when
there are dozens of accidents at the same bend in the same highway, one needs to
re-examine the design of the road” (Stiglitz, 2000).
Yet despite these events, policy for a long time seemed to tilt more towards the
view expressed by Stanley Fischer, then First Deputy Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), that the benefits of financial liberalisation
outweigh the potential costs (Fischer, 1998). In contrast to those earlier crises,
however, the global repercussions of the recent US subprime and eurozone debt
crises have generally soured the mood on financial globalisation. How significant the
change in attitude has been is probably best exemplified by the fact that, as recently
as November 2012, the IMF issued a new institutional view on capital flows (IMF,
2012). Therein, in what many commentators have interpreted as a major ideological
shift and a sharp reversal of its position during the 1990s, the Fund accepts the
management of volatile cross-border capital flows through direct controls as long as
those are “transparent, targeted, [and] temporary”.
It is therefore difficult to overstate not only the major importance of international
financial integration, but also its topicality on the global economic policy agenda.
What may at times go unnoticed in the debate, though, is that financial globalisation
has been, and continues to be, a highly heterogeneous process in which some markets
have integrated considerably more rapidly than others, and that the associated risks
and benefits can also differ substantially.
This dissertation attempts to provide new insights into the integration of global
financial markets and to further our understanding of the consequences. To this end,
it analyses three major topics, each of which is treated in its own, self-contained
chapter. A good compass to this dissertation and as to where each of the three
2
Preface
chapters fits in is provided by considering the spectrum of financial contracts available
to households, corporations, and governments.
On one end of the spectrum, there is financial intermediation through banks that
grant classic loans, an activity which regularly involves a close relationship between
banks and borrowers (Boot, 2000). It is perhaps therefore that banking markets tend
to be less internationally integrated than the markets for other financial instruments
(see, eg, Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula, and Pagano, 2002; Baele, Ferrando,
Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet, 2004) and that international bank lending is among
the least volatile of financial cross-border flows (Gabriele, Baratav, and Parikh,
2000).
On the other end of the spectrum are instruments of portfolio investment such
as stocks and bonds. These can be traded with relative ease by banks and other
financial institutions on a transaction-by-transaction basis, involving virtually no
relationship between the parties concerned. While these markets exhibit a higher
level of international integration, portfolio flows have also been found to be the
most unstable (eg, Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000). Exposure
to portfolio flows has consequently been identified as a major risk in terms of the
vulnerability of, in particular, emerging and developing countries to so-called “sudden
stops”, which can have a highly disruptive impact on the real economy (Reinhart
and Calvo, 2000).
Starting out at the banking end of the spectrum, the first chapter of this dissertation
examines the frictions that shape international loan portfolios and the integration of
global banking markets. The second chapter turns to the sovereign bond market at
the opposite end and looks at whether changes in one country’s credit rating spill
over across borders to the refinancing costs of other sovereigns. In the third chapter,
I investigate the behaviour of foreign banks in the market for syndicated loans, which
3
Preface
constitute a hybrid of traditional bank credit and portfolio investment and which
are a vital source of financing for borrowers in emerging and developing economies.
In the following, I sketch in more detail the central questions analysed in each of the
three chapters and highlight their key results and contributions. The first chapter is
motivated by two seemingly contradictory observations on the international credit
portfolios held by large German banks.1 On the one hand, despite a massive increase
in their foreign exposure over the past two decades more generally, these banks’
portfolios continue to be relatively concentrated in that only a small number of
countries account for the lion’s share of foreign lending. On the other hand, the
existence of notable business cycle asynchronicity between countries suggests that
banks could achieve major diversification gains by holding more diversified portfolios.
We conjecture that this discrepancy is due to country-specific frictions that drive a
wedge between the potential and the effective risk and return in international lending.
To investigate this, we first define an explicit, frictionless benchmark scenario by
computing mean-variance optimised portfolios that we could expect to observe in
the absence of country-specific frictions. Based on a bank-country panel for the
period between 2003 and 2007 for large, internationally oriented German banks and
a representative set of 35 countries, we find that German banks’ international credit
portfolios deviate substantially from this benchmark. As this indicates that frictions
do indeed play a role, we then examine more closely which geographical, institutional,
and regulatory variables explain those deviations.
Our results point to the institutional environment and banking regulations as
constituting important frictions in international lending. In particular, countries
with more developed institutions, stricter capital regulations, transparency in the
banking sector, and stronger supervision tend to be overweighted by German banks.
1This chapter is based on the article “Diversification and Determinants of International Credit
Portfolios: Evidence from German Banks”, which is joint work with Matthias Köhler from the
Deutsche Bundesbank (see Böninghausen and Köhler, 2012).
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Better institutions, for example, such as higher bureaucratic and legal efficiency,
may lower agency costs and thereby improve a country’s de facto risk-return profile
relative to other countries, causing it to be overweighted. Destinations that are
more integrated with Germany in the real sector are overweighted as well, while
eurozone membership also introduces some positive bias towards member countries.
However, more distant countries are not systematically underweighted, suggesting
that informational frictions in international banking do not increase monotonically
with distance.
Overall, the evidence suggests that German banks’ international credit portfolios are
not carved in stone. Rather than being shaped by factors that cannot change over
time, deviations from our benchmark are largely due to factors within the hands of
policy makers. Hence, improvements and convergence of institutional and regulatory
frameworks around the world could reduce the overweighting and underweighting of
countries in the portfolios of German banks. This also has more general implications.
Even though institutional and regulatory changes would certainly take time to
accomplish, there is reason to believe that they could contribute to banking markets
becoming more internationally integrated in the future.
The second chapter takes up a highly topical debate, which has resurfaced in the
wake of sovereign stress in the eurozone, on whether the announcements of sovereign
rating changes by major credit rating agencies impact on the refinancing costs of
other governments.2 Moreover, transcending the level of mere debate, worries over
so-called negative spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign bond yields are
understood to have been at least partly responsible for recent, actual changes in
European Union legislation on rating agencies. While spillovers are thus highly
relevant from a policy perspective, their presumed existence is not straightforward to
2This chapter is based on the article “Credit Ratings and Cross-Border Bond Market Spillovers”,
which is joint work with Michael Zabel from the University of Munich (see Böninghausen and Zabel,
2013).
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identify in financial markets, where confounding events are ubiquitous and hamper
the establishment of clear counterfactuals.
We therefore make a methodological contribution to the literature in proposing a novel
empirical strategy to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects of
sovereign rating announcements. This is made possible by collecting an extensive
dataset of the complete history of rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to
73 countries between 1994 and 2011. Exploiting substantial variation across crisis
and non-crisis periods as well as developed and emerging economies, we perform an
explicit counterfactual analysis. This pits bond market reactions to small revisions
in an agency’s assessment of a country’s creditworthiness against reactions to all
other, more major changes. Importantly, we demonstrate how it helps avoid the
problems associated with a classic event-study approach in a spillover context, and
how it relieves us of having to make additional assumptions as in a number of other
papers.
We find that there is a major asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment
of ratings. Whereas there is robust evidence in favour of significant spillovers
following sovereign rating downgrades — the main concern of policy makers —,
other countries’ bond market reactions to upgrades appear to be much more muted
at best. Investigating the potential channels of spillovers across countries, we find
that spillovers from downgrades are more pronounced for countries within the same
region. Strikingly, however, we find that bilateral trade linkages, financial integration,
or fundamental similarities between countries cannot explain why belonging to a
common region amplifies negative spillover effects.
This is particularly interesting in view of the notion inherent in many policy discus-
sions and proposals that spillovers are in some sense unwarranted, so as to merit
an intervention by the state to constrain the agencies’ scope of action. While the
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amount of measurable fundamentals is naturally limited, our findings do not suggest
that concerns over countries being found “guilty by association” in financial markets
can be easily dismissed.
The third chapter is also motivated by an issue that looms large on the agenda of
policy makers. It focuses explicitly on emerging and developing countries which are
heavily reliant on external sources of financing, and which have a history of being
subject to sudden stops of the inflows of foreign capital that were accompanied by
significant declines in real activity. Because a substantial portion of these flows is
accounted for by international syndicated loans — where two or more banks jointly
agree to lend to a borrower —, the chapter takes a closer look at the behaviour of
foreign banks in this market. Specifically, it asks whether there is a group of foreign
banks that participate more reliably in the provision of such loans than others, in
particular when economic conditions in the emerging market deteriorate.
My analysis indeed provides evidence for important differences in foreign bank
behaviour. I begin by drawing a dividing line between those foreign banks that
participated in the first ever syndicated loan deals in a given country (“early partici-
pants”) and those that did not (“late participants”). The reason is that, in those
early deals, the heterogeneity in banks’ assessments of individual country risk was
likely extraordinarily high, as were information asymmetries vis-à-vis borrowers in
countries that had just opened up to foreign capital. I then go on to document
for the extremely adverse scenario of sudden stops that the composition of loan
syndicates changes over the course of such episodes. Whereas early participants start
to represent an increasing fraction of syndicate members on deals signed whilst the
sudden stop is still ongoing and thereafter, the pattern for late participants is quite
the opposite.
Regression analysis shows that these specific patterns of differences in behaviour
between the two groups of foreign banks are more general, and that they extend to
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their responsiveness to more regular changes in economic conditions as well. In more
detail, I estimate a linear probability model of individual foreign banks’ decisions
to join a given deal in a country or not, conditional on whether they belong to
the group of early or late participants. Based on a total of 5,593 loan deals in 68
countries, I find that early participants are 0.9 percentage points more likely to sign
up for further syndicated loan deals in a given country than other foreign banks.
With an average participation probability in the sample of about 3.2 per cent, this
points to early participation introducing major path dependence into syndicated
lending to emerging markets. Moreover, as economic conditions deteriorate, the gap
in participation probabilities between early and late participants tends to widen.
This effect is particularly pronounced when considering non-Japanese parent banks,
for which a one sample standard deviation drop in real GDP growth is linked to a
widening of the wedge between early and late participants’ probabilities of close to
0.4 percentage points. Hence, there are differences in responsiveness to economic
conditions between the two groups in addition to level differences in participation.
The chapter contributes to a large literature on foreign bank activity in emerging
markets. In spite of syndicated loans being an important element in the external
financing mix of these countries, however, research has largely focused on traditional
bank loans extended through the local affiliates of foreign banks and generally
benchmarked foreign against domestic banks. To the best of my knowledge, my
analysis offers the first investigation into differential foreign bank behaviour in
emerging syndicated loan markets. It paints a richer picture, which can be relevant
for policy makers who may want to monitor the composition of loan syndicates
between early and late participants. Furthermore, the results highlight the risks that
may come with broadening the creditor base at the expense of early participants
who appear to provide more reliable funding.
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Painting a richer picture is also the main contribution of this dissertation. The three
chapters in conjunction emphasise the complexity of assessing the level of international
financial integration of different markets and the risks and benefits that come with
it. Ranging from international banking — where integration has been slower than in
other areas but might be enhanced through changes to institutional and regulatory
frameworks — to sovereign bond markets — where mere announcements on one
country’s perceived creditworthiness have immediate and not entirely understood
repercussions on the refinancing costs of other governments —, policy makers are
faced with a wide array of problems that require specifically targeted responses.
Difficult though it may be to find and implement those, this dissertation goes some
way towards a better understanding of a few relevant issues to begin with. At
the same time, there is ample room for further research to pick up on the themes
investigated herein and to shed more light on other aspects of financial globalisation.
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Chapter 1
Diversification and Determinants
of International Credit Portfolios:
Evidence from German Banks*
1.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis and the ongoing debt crisis have brought to centre stage
the activities of large, globally oriented banks and their importance in studying
international financial integration. In fact, when the first signs of financial turmoil
began to show in 2007, the foreign claims of banks reporting to the Bank for
International Settlements stood at $34 trn at the end of the year as compared to
only $11 trn in 2000, and just $1 trn in 1990. Banks from Germany, which hold
a substantial portion of these claims, have likewise increased their international
exposure through both cross-border lending and the establishment of branches and
*This chapter is based on joint work with Matthias Köhler from the Deutsche Bundesbank. It
represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche
Bundesbank or its staff.
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subsidiaries abroad. At the end of 2007, foreign activities already accounted for
between 50 and 70 per cent of the total assets of major German banks.
In particular, the expansion into foreign markets creates the potential for banks to
diversify across countries by exploiting the less-than-perfect co-movement of business
cycles around the world. For instance, Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2008) point out
that notable business cycle asynchronicity exists between industrial countries on
the one hand, and emerging market economies and developing countries on the
other. This suggests that, potentially, major diversification gains can be realised by
lending to the latter. However, international capital flows continue to be primarily
concentrated on developed markets (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). Large, globally
oriented German banks also focus strongly on developed countries and concentrate
about 90 per cent of their foreign private-sector lending on a set of 10 countries.
In this chapter, we examine the seeming inconsistency of these observations. We
hypothesise that German banks may choose not to diversify because of the existence
of country-specific frictions such as institutions, regulations, and other factors. These
frictions might drive a wedge between the potential and the effective risk and return
in foreign lending, thus shaping the bank portfolios that we observe.
To explore our hypothesis, we proceed in steps. In the first step, we ask whether banks’
international credit portfolios are consistent with an explicit, frictionless benchmark
scenario. To this end, we compare their actual portfolios to mean-variance portfolios
that we could expect to observe in the absence of country-specific frictions. We find
that German banks’ international credit portfolios deviate substantially from our
benchmark portfolios, indicating that the concentration is indeed due to frictions.
In the second step, we investigate which country-specific frictions cause German
banks not to diversify and to overweight some countries whilst underweighting others.
We do so by regressing the differences between banks’ actual credit portfolios and our
11
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benchmark portfolios on a broad set of geographical, institutional, and regulatory
variables.
In short, our results show that the institutional environment and banking regulations
are important determinants of the international credit portfolios of German banks.
In particular, countries with more developed institutions, stricter capital regulations,
transparency in the banking sector, and stronger supervision tend to be overweighted
by German banks. The same applies to countries with larger and more developed
banking markets. Moreover, destinations that exhibit a higher level of economic
integration with Germany in the real sector are overweighted as well. Eurozone
membership also appears to introduce some bias towards those countries that have
introduced the common currency. In contrast, there is no strong evidence that
informational frictions increase monotonically with distance since more distant
countries are not systematically underweighted.
Our analysis is based on the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External Position Reports of
German Banks. This dataset contains detailed information on the foreign exposure
of all German banks, including their foreign branches and subsidiaries. From this
dataset, we construct a bank-country panel for the period between 2003 and 2007 for
large, internationally oriented German banks and a representative set of 35 countries
from all regions of the world that comprehensively reflects the investment opportunity
set of German banks.
For this set of countries, we compute mean-variance portfolios à la Markowitz (1952,
1959) that we could expect to observe in the absence of country-specific frictions.
These portfolios serve as the benchmark throughout our analysis. They are calibrated
on the basis of representative assets that capture the potential, as opposed to the
effective, risk and return of lending to a given country. Crucially, those not only
indicate the risk and return of a country in isolation but also account for diversification
gains that can be achieved by balancing relatively low loan repayments in one country
12
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with relatively high loan repayments in another. Hence, the benchmark portfolios
should well reflect the potential diversification gains that German banks could achieve
by exploiting the asynchroniticy of business cycles around the world.
Our approach is most closely related to the work by Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard
(2010). They use aggregate, locational data on the cross-border assets of banks from
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States in 23 countries
between 1995 and 2003 to identify barriers to international financial integration.
The authors find that the probability of a country’s being overweighted against
a Markowitz-type benchmark decreases with the severity of capital controls, and
increases with a survey measure of trust among residents in the destination country.1
In contrast to Buch et al. (2010), we consider a much larger set of 35 countries
that more comprehensively reflects the investment opportunity set of banks. This
is relevant as the gains from portfolio diversification tend to increase in the asyn-
chronicity of business cycles across countries. In order to adequately reflect these
gains and to properly identify the relevant frictions in international banking, it
is important to consider a wide range of potential lending destinations that are
sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of both geography and economic development.
The dataset used in this chapter also allows us to improve on Buch et al. (2010) and
to contribute to the literature on the determinants of international bank lending and
portfolio allocation in two other important aspects. First, whereas Buch et al. (2010)
concentrate on cross-border exposure only, we examine the consolidated foreign credit
exposure of banks. This comprises both cross-border and affiliate claims. The latter
have become particularly important over the past two decades, to the point that the
average bank in our sample relies on branches and subsidiaries for about 40 to 50 per
1The chapter is also conceptually related to Garćıa-Herrero and Vázquez (2007) in that the
authors also calibrate explicit mean-variance portfolios. They use those as a benchmark to evaluate
how large banks from eight major industrial countries allocate assets to their foreign subsidiaries.
Banks are found to leave opportunities for international diversification largely unexploited.
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cent of its foreign credit exposure. Moreover, solely focusing on cross-border lending
might give a distorted view of the relevance of frictions due to potential substitution
effects between cross-border and affiliate lending (Garćıa-Herrero and Mart́ınez Peŕıa,
2007; Garćıa-Herrero and Vázquez, 2007). For instance, informational frictions when
lending across borders might be overcome or alleviated by a local presence in the
form of a branch or subsidiary.
Second, the micro nature of our data makes it possible to focus only on those
large, globally oriented banks that can be assumed to incorporate diversification
considerations into their lending decisions. Therefore, deviations from the benchmark
can be interpreted as stemming from country-specific frictions that drive a wedge
between the potential and the effective risk and return in foreign lending rather than
non-diversifying behaviour on the part of banks. Furthermore, given that the over-
or underweighting of countries in German banks’ credit portfolios may also partly
reflect that some banks single out strategically important countries, we are also able
to control for this heterogeneity in banks’ international portfolio strategies.
Thereby, this chapter contributes to the literature on the determinants of international
asset portfolios in general, and international bank lending in particular. A significant
number of empirical papers investigate cross-border flows and holdings of bonds and
equities (eg, Portes, Rey, and Oh, 2001; Gelos and Wei, 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2005; Portes and Rey, 2005; Lane, 2006), some of them also in a mean-variance
setting (De Santis and Gérard, 2006; Baele, Pungulescu, and Ter Horst, 2007).
Similar research into international bank lending has been conducted more recently
(eg, Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008;
Heuchemer, Kleimeier, and Sander, 2009; Papaioannou, 2009).
In more detail, our results suggest that a country’s institutional environment consti-
tutes a major friction in international banking. In line with papers that stress the
importance of institutional quality (eg, Alfaro et al., 2008; Papaioannou, 2009), we
14
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find that countries with more developed institutions are overweighted by German
banks relative to the benchmark portfolios. In countries where factors as, say, the
protection of property rights, absence of corruption, or bureaucratic and legal effi-
ciency are not as highly developed, agency costs tend to be higher. This worsens the
risk-return profile of lending to those markets and drives a wedge between potential
and actual risk and return.
Banking regulations are also important determinants of international credit portfolios.
Moreover, the evidence indicates that these regulations matter in their own right.
That is, they are more than merely a reflection of the institutional environment
since they impact on a country’s overweighting even after controlling for general
institutional quality. In particular, German banks tend to overweight those countries
that have strong regulations in the key areas identified by the Basel accords —
regulatory capital, supervisory review, and market disclosure. This adds to evidence
that restrictions are not necessarily a deterrent to foreign bank lending (see Committee
on the Global Financial System [CGFS], 2010).
Countries that are more economically integrated with Germany are also found to
be overweighted. Markets that account for a larger share of German real-sector
foreign direct investment tend to exhibit lower frictions vis-à-vis Germany, which
should favour bank lending to these destinations, too. In addition, this chapter looks
at eurozone membership as another aspect of integration with Germany. Sharing
a common currency can improve a country’s actual risk-return profile from the
perspective of a German bank relative to what it would be if the bank had to either
bear exchange rate risk or hedge itself against it, which is costly. Indeed there is
evidence, albeit slightly less compelling, that eurozone countries are overweighted
against the benchmark.
However, more distant countries are not systematically underweighted. One would
expect that to be the case if informational frictions between German banks and
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foreign borrowers increased monotonically with distance to the destination country.
Hence, information asymmetries in international banking appear to follow more
complex patterns. This supports the evidence presented by Buch et al. (2010). Also
benchmarking actual bank portfolios against mean-variance optimised ones, they do
not find an effect of distance on the probability of a country’s being overweighted
either.
Overall, the evidence suggests that German banks’ international credit portfolios
are not carved in stone. Instead of being shaped by factors that cannot change over
time, deviations from our benchmark are largely determined by factors within the
hands of policy makers. Accordingly, improvements and convergence of institutional
and regulatory frameworks around the world might reduce the overweighting or
underweighting of countries in the portfolios of German banks. Hence, even though
such changes would certainly take time, there is reason to believe that they could
contribute to banking markets in general becoming more internationally integrated
in the future.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the dataset and charac-
terises the actual international credit portfolios of German banks. The methodology
and properties of the benchmark portfolios are outlined in Section 1.3, while the fric-
tions of interest and the empirical strategy to identify them are discussed in Section
1.4. The estimation results are presented in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 International credit portfolios of German banks
1.2.1 Dataset
Data on international credit portfolios are from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External
Position Reports of German Banks. This dataset contains monthly micro-level data
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on the external assets and liabilities of German banks, including their branches and
subsidiaries abroad. Moreover, foreign assets and liabilities are broken down along a
number of dimensions such as destination country, asset class, counterparty sector,
currency denomination, and maturity.2 The richness of the dataset makes it highly
suitable for investigating the international diversification of bank credit portfolios.
Three advantages stand out in particular.
First, data are available at the bank level. While we are interested in the country-
specific frictions due to which banks’ actual portfolios deviate from benchmark
portfolios, individual banks might differ in their country exposures for reasons other
than the factors we are able to observe. For instance, banks may have a lot of
experience and expertise in a certain market or other competitive advantages. There
may also be banks which single out certain strategically important countries in their
international portfolio strategy. The bank-country dimension of our dataset allows
us to control for such unobserved heterogeneity in our econometric analysis (see
1.4.1).
Second, reporting is not confined to the external positions of bank headquarters but
includes those of foreign affiliates as well. This is important since banks have not only
increased their cross-border exposures over the past two decades but also their lending
via branches and subsidiaries (Clarke, Cull, Mart́ınez Peŕıa, and Sánchez, 2003).3
A glance at the data reveals the importance of foreign affiliates for internationally
oriented banks. The average bank in our sample relies on branches and subsidiaries
for about 40 to 50 per cent of its foreign exposure, with percentages even ranging
into the 90s as banks become larger and more internationally active. Moreover,
there is reason to suspect substitution effects in international lending between bank
2For a more detailed documentation, see Fiorentino, Koch, and Rudek (2010).
3Cross-border lending refers to lending conducted directly by the parent bank, ie from a
banking group’s headquarters, rather than by its foreign affiliates. We will therefore use these
terms interchangeably. Likewise, we will also occasionally refer to lending via foreign affiliates as
local lending.
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headquarters and their foreign affiliates. Some loans which used to be extended by
the parent bank may be granted locally once a foreign affiliate has been set up.4
Hence, focusing only on either cross-border or affiliate lending might give a biased
picture of banks’ international diversification and its determinants. In contrast to
Garćıa-Herrero and Vázquez (2007) and Buch et al. (2010), our dataset allows us to
analyse a bank’s consolidated foreign exposure.5
Finally, foreign exposures are reported for the actual country of destination. This
matters because international banks use some foreign countries, most importantly
financial centres, as “hubs” from which to lend to clients in yet other foreign
destinations. Therefore, our data can be seen as providing a further refinement in
that regard as well.
1.2.2 Sample selection
We use the detailed information on foreign claims to focus our analysis along a
number of dimensions and to construct a dataset best suited to addressing our
research question.
First, we focus on a specific set of banks. The key question of this chapter is
whether and, if so, which frictions make banks overweight some countries whilst
underweighting others. We investigate this by benchmarking actual portfolios against
mean-variance optimised ones. In order for deviations from the benchmark to be
interpretable as stemming from country-specific frictions rather than non-diversifying
behaviour on the part of banks, we therefore require that the banks in our sample
be sufficiently large and internationally oriented. These banks can be expected to
incorporate diversification considerations into their international lending decisions.
4Also see Garćıa-Herrero and Mart́ınez Peŕıa (2007) who investigate the mix of international
banks’ foreign claims between cross-border and local affiliate lending.
5Whereas Garćıa-Herrero and Vázquez (2007) rely entirely on foreign subsidiaries data from
Bankscope, the data used in Buch et al. (2010) do not allow the authors to distinguish between the
claims of domestic headquarters and those of foreign subsidiaries in a given country.
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For Germany, we identify those banks as the major commercial banks and the head
institutions of the savings and co-operative banks. We exclude individual savings
and co-operative banks as well as small or mid-sized banks due to their focus on
domestic activities. Specialised lenders are not included either since they pursue
distinct business models (eg, mortgage lending, business development loans, car
financing).
Our final bank sample consists of 18 institutions. Compared to all other German
banks, the banks in our sample have a considerably larger exposure to foreign
countries. For example, while the banks in our sample have significant credit exposure
to roughly 50 countries, all other German banks have, on average, substantial exposure
to less than one country. The banks in our sample also maintain significantly more
foreign affiliates than the other banks. Whereas the former have branches and/or
subsidiaries in an average of 10 countries, the latter only have a local presence in
approximately three foreign countries. Overall, the banks in our sample are sufficiently
large and internationally oriented to pursue an international diversification strategy.
Second, we constrain our investigation to the period from 2003 to 2007. We exclude
the global financial and debt crisis years because our research question appears most
reasonable in “normal” times, ie relative tranquillity in financial markets. In times of
financial distress, however, we would expect short-term motives (eg, loss reduction)
to take precedence over strategic considerations like the international diversification
of credit portfolios.
Third, we focus on loans to the non-bank private sector.6 Table 1.1 shows that this
lending aggregate is the most important component of German banks’ total foreign
claims over the entire sample period (42 per cent in 2007). Holdings of foreign bond
and commercial paper (33 per cent) and credit to foreign banks (18 per cent) are
less important. We do not include bonds and commercial paper since we cannot be
6Using the same database, Düwel, Frey, and Lipponer (2011) make similar choices.
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Table 1.1: Foreign claims of German banks, by asset class
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total foreign claims 2,043 2,352 2,370 2,690 2,977
Credit to foreign non-bank
private sector
818 882 900 1,018 1,236
(40%) (37%) (38%) (38%) (42%)
Credit to foreign banks
522 653 578 589 548
(26%) (28%) (24%) (22%) (18%)
Foreign bonds and commercial
paper (any sector)
582 671 734 897 992
(28%) (29%) (31%) (33%) (33%)
Foreign shares (any sector)
50 77 97 123 136
(2%) (3%) (4%) (5%) (5%)
Notes — This table shows the foreign claims of all German banks broken down by asset class. Data are
from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External Position Reports of German Banks. All exposures are in ebn.
sure that this asset category does not also capture securitised assets. This might
be problematic due to the fact that securitisation was particularly prevalent during
our sample period in the run-up to the global financial crisis and driven by different
motives. Likewise, we exclude credit to foreign banks which is predominantly short-
term in nature and not driven by long-term portfolio considerations. Foreign equity
(five per cent) is negligible with regard to the international exposure of German
banks.
Finally, despite constraints arising from the calculation of benchmark portfolios (see
1.3.1), we are able to construct a representative sample of 35 countries covering all
major regions of the world (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). This set of countries
covers about 85 per cent of the total foreign non-bank credit by the banks in
our sample. By capturing a substantial amount of cross-country heterogeneity
and potential diversification opportunities, we can expect to gain insights into the
country-specific determinants of German banks’ international credit portfolios.
We consolidate the loans to the non-bank private sector for all 18 banking groups
over the sample period by aggregating the exposures of the parent bank and all
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of its foreign affiliates. That is, we assume that German parent banks incorporate
both their foreign branches and their subsidiaries in their international strategy.
This seems reasonable due to the special importance of internal capital markets for
German banks. McCauley, McGuire, and von Peter (2010), for example, show that
the foreign affiliates of German banks rely more heavily on intra-group funds than
other international banking groups. This suggests that the affiliates of German banks
are particularly integrated with their parent. We therefore include both branches
and subsidiaries in the analysis.
1.2.3 Stylised facts
Figure 1.1 shows the development of credit to the foreign non-bank private sector
between 2003 and 2007 for both the total foreign exposure of all German banks
(circa 2,000) and that of the 18 sample banks to the representative set of 35 countries.
In each case, there is a marked upward trend, with the former increasing from e818
bn to e1.2 trn, and the latter from e617 bn to e865 bn. Both aggregates also
move remarkably in tandem, indicating that our sample is highly comprehensive and
representative along both the bank and country dimensions. Overall, our sample
consistently accounts for 70 per cent or more of all foreign credit by the entire
German banking system. It is to this sample that we will refer in the following.
The top 10 lending destinations of German banks at year-end 2007 are presented
in Table 1.2 from both an aggregate and a micro-level perspective. The aggregate
figures in the left-hand panel show the relative country weights in banks’ international
credit portfolios after aggregating the different country exposures over all banks in
our sample. In the right-hand panel, we provide summary statistics on the basis of
individual credit portfolios.
The United States and United Kingdom are by far the most important lending
destinations for the banks in our sample. On aggregate, the US account for almost
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Figure 1.1: Credit to foreign non-bank private sector
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Notes — This figure shows overall exposures to the non-bank private sector for both all German banks
with respect to any foreign country and the 18 internationally oriented banks in the sample towards the
representative set of 35 countries over the 2003–2007 period. Percentages represent the portion of the
entire German banking system’s worldwide non-bank private sector credit accounted for by the sample
banks and countries. Data are from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External Position Reports of German
Banks.
40 per cent and the UK for roughly a third of total lending to foreign non-banks.
Six of the remaining top lending destinations are located in Western Europe (about
17 per cent), the other two being Japan (three per cent) and Poland (1.5 per cent).
Together, the 10 countries account for more than 90 per cent of total lending to
non-banks. The disaggregated perspective is mostly in line with the observations
at the aggregate level. The US and UK continue to be the two primary target
countries for non-bank credit. Western European countries remain important as well,
even though the rank ordering changes. Interestingly, Japan is no longer among
the top lending destinations. In contrast, while Russia was not among the top 10
countries based on the aggregated data, it ranks in ninth place on the basis of the
disaggregated data.
A closer look at the micro-level data provides further interesting insights into bank
heterogeneity in portfolio holdings. For example, the standard deviations are large
and frequently a multiple of the respective medians for all countries except the US
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Table 1.2: Main lending destinations of German banks (year-end 2007)
Aggregated Disaggregated
Median Std dev
United States 38.7% United States 29.0% 12.5%
United Kingdom 33.6% United Kingdom 13.6% 14.8%
Ireland 3.8% Netherlands 4.7% 11.0%
Italy 3.2% France 4.0% 12.1%
France 3.1% Switzerland 2.9% 4.1%
Japan 3.0% Spain 2.8% 3.7%
Spain 2.8% Ireland 1.8% 13.5%
Netherlands 2.6% Italy 1.1% 3.6%
Switzerland 1.6% Russia 1.0% 1.7%
Poland 1.5% Poland 1.0% 5.1%
Notes — This table shows the top 10 lending destinations in terms of foreign non-bank private sector credit
for the 18 internationally oriented German banks in the sample and the representative set of 35 countries.
The left-hand panel shows country shares calculated after aggregating exposures over all sample banks.
The figures in the right-hand panel are summary statistics over individual banks’ relative exposures to a
given country. Data are from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External Position Reports of German Banks.
and UK. This indicates that German banks take quite different views on lending
to specific countries. In addition, this heterogeneous behaviour is not confined to
emerging economies like Russia or Poland, but is observable with regard to highly
developed nations like France or the Netherlands as well. Overall, the descriptive
analysis of the main lending destinations points to the importance of allowing for
bank heterogeneity in the empirical investigation of country-level frictions.
1.3 Benchmark portfolios
1.3.1 Methodology
The goal of this chapter is to examine which country-specific frictions drive a wedge
between banks’ actual portfolios and benchmark portfolios, ie portfolios we could
expect to observe as the outcome of optimal international portfolio diversification in
the absence of those frictions.
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In a fashion similar to Buch et al. (2010) and Garćıa-Herrero and Vázquez (2007), we
compute these benchmark portfolios by applying the Markowitz (1952, 1959) mean-
variance framework on the basis of representative assets. We make some amendments
to those portfolios to make them more suitable for our analysis. Most importantly, we
account for the fact that portfolio weights obtained from mean-variance optimisation
are invariant to the size of the respective economies and their capacity to absorb
credit. We therefore introduce more realism by correcting for credit demand.
Representative assets We interpret a bank’s benchmark international credit
portfolio as arising from an optimal choice from a universe of representative assets,
each of which represents one country in our sample. The decision to lend to a
particular country or, more precisely, its non-bank private sector is regarded as
granting a loan to a “typical”, representative company in that country.7 It is this
company’s economic and financial situation that the representative asset is intended
to proxy.
The mean-variance framework then captures the risk-return trade-off faced by banks:
all other things equal, they will prefer countries in which loan repayments are
expected to be higher or less volatile. Crucially, in a portfolio context, banks may
even consider lending to a country for which repayments are expected to be relatively
low, or volatile, or both. The rationale is that banks can exploit the less-than-perfect
correlation between one country’s loan repayments and those in the rest of the
portfolio to improve the risk-return profile of the portfolio as a whole (eg, Berger,
2000). Hence, the benefits of international diversification are greater the less aligned
a country’s economy with the business cycles of other countries.
To measure banks’ expected risk and return in international lending, we would
ideally like to use corporate bond indices. However, we found data availability to be
7Here and in the following, whenever we refer to a country, we mean that country’s non-bank
private sector (see 1.2.2 for our choice of lending aggregate).
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too limited for non-Western countries. Since the benefits of portfolio diversification
stem in large part from considering countries with relatively asynchronous business
cycles, a sample dominated by developed countries with strong business cycle co-
movements would underestimate the potential for international diversification. Hence,
we choose national stock market indices as the representative assets. By mapping
the international credit allocation problem into one among national equity indices,
we are able to construct a dataset with a representative sample of 35 countries from
all regions of the world which comprehensively reflects the investment opportunity
set of German banks.8
The firm-value model by Merton (1974) provides a compelling rationale for the idea
that the stock market contains valuable information about creditworthiness.9 In a
nutshell, the payoff to holders of a company’s risky debt is interpreted as consisting
of two components. The first component is independent of the firm’s asset value and
equal to the face value — ie, the repayment that would be received in the case of
riskless debt. In the presence of credit risk, however, this payoff is reduced if the
company cannot fully honour its commitments. As this happens whenever and the
more the firm’s asset value falls short of face value, the company’s debt value and
default probability depend on the development of its assets. While a higher expected
return on the asset value raises the value of risky debt and reduces the probability
of default, an increase in the volatility of the asset value has the opposite effect.
Since the value of a firm’s assets is not observable, industry models descending from
Merton-type firm-value models infer the asset value and its development over time
from that of a company’s stock.10
8The broader country coverage also implies an increased cross-country heterogeneity in the
frictions examined in this chapter. This should allow us to better identify the relevant effects.
9See Appendix A.1.1 for a more in-depth discussion of how we map the international credit
allocation problem into a mean-variance choice among national equity indices.
10This is the case in Moody’s KMV, for instance. For details on this and other credit risk models,
see Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000), Crosbie and Bohn (2003), and Kealhofer (2003).
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We take that as the starting point for our optimisation and proxy a country’s
representative firm by the return moments of its MSCI Barra national stock market
index. Each equity index in isolation is characterised by expected return µ and
standard deviation σ. It follows from above that banks will, ceteris paribus, prefer
companies from countries with higher µ’s and lower σ’s. In addition, pairwise
correlations ρ of national indices proxy for the degree to which equity markets —
and business cycles — move together in the respective countries. At lower values of
ρ, banks are more likely to engage in diversification between countries.
Table 1.3 reports regional return characteristics estimated at the end of 2007 for
the sample of 35 countries. Interestingly, monthly mean returns are highest in
South America and South and Southeast Asia (1.9 per cent each), and lowest in
Western and Eastern Europe (0.7 per cent each). In general, mean returns in regions
consisting primarily of developing and emerging economies tend to exceed those in
developed regions (also see Table A.2 in the Appendix). At the same time, the more
developed regions of Western Europe and North America carry substantially lower
individual risk. Their return standard deviations of 5.3 and 5.5 per cent, respectively,
are lower than those of any other region in the world. This suggests that their
lending environments are relatively more stable. In contrast, the regions with the
highest mean returns, South America and South and Southeast Asia, are also those
with the highest standard deviations (10.6 and 9.4 per cent, respectively), which
points to a risk-return trade-off in international lending.
Moreover, the return correlations underline the potential diversification gains to
be made. As expected, correlations are consistently higher within than between
regions. The correlation between Western Europe and South and Southeast Asia
(0.28), for instance, is less than half that of Western European countries amongst
one another (0.65). Returns are also highly correlated between Western Europe
and North America (0.59), while correlations are noticeably lower with all other
26
1. Diversification and Determinants of International Credit Portfolios
Table 1.3: Return characteristics, by region (year-end 2007)
Monthly return Correlations
Mean Std dev WE EE NA SA MEA SSA EAO
Western Europe (WE) 0.7% 5.3% 0.65 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.46 0.28 0.40
Eastern Europe (EE) 0.7% 8.8% 0.54 0.51 0.36 0.40 0.28 0.35
North America (NA) 1.4% 5.5% 0.73 0.57 0.57 0.41 0.57
South America (SA) 1.9% 10.6% 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.39
Middle East & Africa (MEA) 1.6% 7.6% 0.45 0.31 0.47
South & Southeast Asia (SSA) 1.9% 9.4% 0.53 0.41
East Asia & Oceania (EAO) 1.3% 7.3% 0.56
Notes — This table characterises the monthly return moments of the 35 representative assets in the sample
by their individual means and standard deviations, and by correlations with the other assets. For individual
return characteristics, the reported figures represent median values of the constituent assets’ means and
standard deviations of return in a given region (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). For correlations, the table
reports the median of pairwise return correlations among constituent assets of the regions involved. All
figures are based on nine years of monthly euro/deutschmark returns between January 1999 and December
2007. Section A.1 in the Appendix provides further details.
regions of the world, which predominantly host emerging and developing economies.
Finally, emerging economies are also far from perfectly aligned with each other. This
suggests that discriminating on a country-by-country basis may further increase the
benefits from diversification.
Portfolio optimisation11 Banks are assumed to behave according to the princi-
ples of mean-variance optimisation, as introduced by Markowitz (1952, 1959). At the
portfolio level, they minimise the return volatility σ for any given level of expected
return µ, or maximise µ for any given level of σ. They borrow at a risk-free rate r
in the interbank market12 and optimally invest the funds in the risky representative
assets under short-selling constraints.13 Optimality is achieved when the Sharpe
ratio µ−r
σ
of the portfolio is maximised, ie when the expected excess return over the
risk-free rate per unit of risk is highest. While differences in risk aversion determine
11Appendix A.1.2 provides more information on the portfolio optimisation procedure.
12We focus on large international German banks (see 1.2.2) that rely heavily on short-term
interbank loans to fund their operations rather than retail deposits.
13As our ultimate interest lies in international bank loan portfolios, we rule out the possibility of
short selling because it lacks an intuitive economic interpretation in this context.
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the amount that banks invest at the risk-free rate, the composition of the risky
asset portfolio is identical for all banks. The optimal relative country shares from
mean-variance optimisation therefore obtain as the representative asset weights in
the risky portfolio.
As the inputs for the optimisation (ie, expected returns, standard deviations, and
correlations) are unobserved, they need to be estimated from historical data. To
this end, we use a rolling-window approach based on nine years of monthly returns,
which yields a portfolio for each year-end in the sample period. We also employ
portfolio resampling techniques that account for uncertainty in the estimation of
inputs, and which result in more stable and inclusive portfolios.
Accounting for credit demand The weights from (resampled) mean-variance
optimisation over representative assets do not consider potential credit demand. A
small country, for example, does not possess the same capacity to absorb credit
as larger countries do. However, pure mean-variance optimisation may assign a
weight well above the small country’s share of credit demand relative to the countries
in the portfolio. Sensible benchmark portfolios ought to account for this and be
anchored around the likely relative credit demands of countries. Borrowing the
terminology of Black and Litterman (1992), those relative credit demands can be
thought of as “neutral” starting points for an international credit portfolio. Mean-
variance optimisation then provides a bank with views on the relative merit of
investing in different countries from a diversification perspective, so that it can
adjust the neutral weights accordingly. As the literature frequently proxies credit
demand by GDP and the latter also has the desirable property of being largely
unaffected by the country-specific frictions we examine, we use relative GDP shares
as neutral anchors.14 Because it is unclear how much confidence a bank would place
14See Haselmann (2006), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2009), or De Haas and
Van Lelyveld (2011) for the use of GDP as a demand proxy in different contexts.
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in mean-variance optimisation as opposed to the neutral weights at any given point
in time, we employ a simple heuristic and define the final benchmark weight for
a country as the unweighted average of its weight from resampled mean-variance
optimisation and its relative GDP share.15 However, we later check the robustness
of our results to alternative weighting schemes that put more weight on the outcome
from mean-variance optimisation and less on relative GDP shares (see 1.5.3).
1.3.2 Deviations from the benchmark
Table 1.4 gives a first overview of how German banks’ actual portfolios deviate from
the benchmark portfolios for the top 10 lending destinations at the end of 2007.
It reports the degree of overweighting, which is the difference between a country’s
median actual weight and its benchmark weight according to the optimisation
procedure outlined in 1.3.1.
Eight of the 10 most important lending destinations are overweighted to varying de-
grees relative to the benchmark, while Italy and Russia are underweighted. Moreover,
as throughout the sample period, the US and UK are the two most overweighted
countries in German banks’ credit portfolios (13.8 and 10.6 percentage points, re-
spectively). Even though the actual weight on the US is about twice that of the
UK, their degrees of overweighting are quite similar. This is due to the much higher
benchmark weight for the US. In contrast, Russia is heavily underweighted (−9.2
percentage points) relative to a similarly high benchmark weight of 10.2 per cent.
15Similar heuristics are often applied in other contexts with multiple plausible selection criteria,
but in which no single criterion is clearly superior. For instance, the shares of national central
banks in the European Central Bank’s capital are calculated using a key which is the unweighted
average of countries’ population and GDP shares. Also see Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2002) who
propose a “fifty-fifty” weighting scheme as a simple and transparent reference point in the context
of shock analysis.
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Table 1.4: Overweighting for main lending destinations (year-end 2007)
Country Overweighting Actual weight Benchmark weight
United States 13.8% 29.0% 15.2%
United Kingdom 10.6% 13.6% 3.0%
Netherlands 3.9% 4.7% 0.8%
France 1.2% 4.0% 2.8%
Switzerland 2.2% 2.9% 0.7%
Spain 1.2% 2.8% 1.6%
Ireland 1.5% 1.8% 0.3%
Italy −1.2% 1.1% 2.3%
Russia −9.2% 1.0% 10.2%
Poland 0.3% 1.0% 0.7%
Notes — This table shows the overweighting for the top 10 lending destinations of German banks at the
end of 2007. Overweighting is defined as the difference between actual and benchmark weights. The
actual weight for a given country is the median over the 18 sample banks’ individual weights (see Table
1.2) relative to the representative set of 35 countries. Benchmark weights are calculated according to the
methodology outlined in 1.3.1. Data are from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s External Position Reports of
German Banks.
Overall, Table 1.4 indicates a significant potential for diversification by lending
to underweighted countries. In the next section, we analyse empirically which
country-specific frictions explain the over- and underweighting of countries.
1.4 Empirical setup
1.4.1 Estimation framework
We use the benchmark portfolios as the reference point for banks’ actual international
credit portfolios to investigate the impact of country-specific frictions with the
following econometric model:
owc,b,t = α + INTEGc,t · β + INSTc,t · γ +Xc,t · δ + µc,b + εc,b,t .
Here, owc,b,t = wc,b,t − optc,t is the degree of overweighting of country c in bank b’s
international credit portfolio at the end of year t, ie the difference between the actual
weight wc,b,t and the optimal weight optc,t from the benchmark.
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µc,b is a bank-country specific effect that captures individual bank behaviour towards
specific countries in our dataset. For instance, some banks may be better able to
exploit investment opportunities in certain countries due to greater expertise or
experience in a market. Banks may also single out strategically important countries
without the aim to diversify. Due to the bank-country dimension of our dataset, we
can control for such unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
The country-specific frictions, which will be described in greater detail in the following,
are included in the vectors INTEGc,t and INSTc,t. INTEGc,t contains variables that
measure the degree of economic integration between Germany and the destination
country, while INSTc,t controls for the latter’s institutional and regulatory framework.
Xc,t is a matrix of additional control variables.
We estimate the model by random effects. This is due to the fact that the variables
used in the investigation — in particular those that capture the institutional and
regulatory environment in a country — exhibit much larger between than within vari-
ation, which would make fixed-effects estimates very imprecise (see, eg, Wooldridge,
2010). Moreover, some controls do not vary over time at all and could therefore not
be identified with a fixed-effects estimator due to time-demeaning. Also note that we
cannot include bank variables as level terms in our model since regression coefficients
would be zero by definition.16 In the robustness checks, however, we further exploit
the bank-level dimension of our dataset by including interaction terms to identify
whether the banks in our sample differ in their reactions to frictions (see 1.5.3).
16This is because we look at countries’ shares in the international credit portfolios of German
banks, which are defined as percentages. Hence, even though larger banks, on average, extend more
credit to any given country than smaller banks, the portfolio shares for each bank in any given year
always add up to 100 per cent. Equivalently, the overweighting or underweighting across countries
for a given bank will add up to zero. The regression coefficient of any bank variable will therefore
be zero as well.
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1.4.2 Country-specific frictions
In the following, we present the variables used in the regression analysis to capture
various frictions that might drive a wedge between banks’ actual and benchmark
portfolios. These frictions are related to the degree of economic integration between
Germany and the destination country as well as the institutional environment in
general, and banking regulations in particular.
Economic integration We would expect frictions to be lower if the degree of
economic integration with Germany is higher. Countries that are more integrated
with the German economy should thus be more overweighted, or less underweighted,
in German banks’ international credit portfolios. We measure the degree of economic
integration with Germany by the following two variables:
FDI — We include in our regressions FDI, which is a country’s share in the real-
sector outward FDI stocks of German non-banks.17 Because countries that receive
larger volumes of German foreign direct investment should be characterised by
lower frictions vis-à-vis Germany, we would expect FDI to be positively related to
the degree of overweighting. Another reason that would suggest such a positive
relationship is that German banks might follow domestic companies when those
venture abroad and set up operations in a foreign country.18 In this case, the decision
to lend to a country would not be primarily driven by the desire to seek a particular
foreign exposure but to retain an existing customer base at home. In a way, this
follow-your-client motive can be viewed as competing with that of international
17We do not include FDI by banks or other financial firms in that measure. The establishment
of subsidiaries in a foreign country by banks would not only be reflected in an increase of the FDI
measure, but also of the country’s overweighting in banks’ portfolios. We would therefore introduce
simultaneity into our estimation.
18This rationale for the international activity of banks has been stressed as early as Goldberg
and Saunders (1980, 1981). However, empirical evidence has been mixed. Recent studies (eg,
Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Berger, Dai, Ongena, and Smith, 2003; Seth, Nolee, and Mohanty, 1998;
Williams, 1998) tend to paint a more nuanced picture of the importance of the follow-your-client
motive than earlier contributions (eg, Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
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diversification. It may be particularly relevant in a bank-dominated financial system
like Germany, where many firms rely on their so-called “Hausbank” (see, eg, Onetti
and Pisoni, 2009).
EURO — Eurozone membership might also affect whether a country is overweighted
or underweighted against the benchmark as several empirical studies provide evidence
that the adoption of the euro may enhance financial integration.19 Hence, we include
a corresponding dummy variable in our regressions.
Institutional and regulatory environment Overweighting or underweighting
is also likely to depend on frictions related to the institutional and regulatory
environment in the destination country.
INSTITUTIONS — We capture the overall institutional environment of the destina-
tion country by the Index of Economic Freedom (see Heritage Foundation, 2013).
This covers, among other things, the strength of property rights, absence of corrup-
tion, and regulatory efficiency. Functioning institutions should reduce monitoring,
information, and agency costs. Bureaucratic and legal efficiency, for instance, can al-
leviate agency costs by settling disputes arising from contract incompleteness. Banks
might be unwilling to bear these costs despite potential gains from higher returns
and better diversification opportunities that are in principle associated with lending
abroad. Higher index values indicate a more developed institutional environment.
In addition to the general institutional environment, we include a set of controls
to capture a number of banking regulations in the destination country. In par-
ticular, we capture the three pillars of the Basel II framework, namely regulatory
capital (CAPITAL), supervisory review (SUPERVISION ), and market disclosure
(TRANSPARENCY ):
19For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and Lane (2006) give evidence of a eurozone bias
in the international holdings by eurozone countries in stocks and bonds, respectively. Similarly,
Blank and Buch (2007) detect a positive and significant impact of the euro on the bilateral foreign
assets held by banks.
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CAPITAL — The Capital Regulatory Index from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001)
controls for regulations pertaining to the capitalisation of banks in the destination
country, with higher values corresponding to stricter requirements.20 Capital regula-
tions, which are the cornerstone and first pillar of the Basel II framework, apply to
both genuinely domestic banks in the destination country and to the local operations
of foreign banks in the form of subsidiaries. In contrast to branches, subsidiaries are
incorporated under local law and are legally separate from their parent banks. The
latter generally do not assume responsibility for the liabilities of their subsidiaries,
which therefore need to be capitalised independently according to host country
regulations.21
SUPERVISION — The second pillar of Basel II is captured by the Official Supervisory
Power Index. It measures the degree to which supervisors have the authority to
take specific actions to prevent and correct problems in a bank. These include,
for example, the right of the supervisor to meet with and demand information
from auditors, to force a bank to change its internal organisational structure, or to
supersede the rights of shareholders.
TRANSPARENCY — Disclosure requirements in the banking industry, as measured
by the Private Monitoring Index, capture the effect of scrutiny from private market
forces. It reflects the amount of financial information that banks in the destination
country have to disclose to the public, where higher values are associated with stricter
20This and all following regulatory variables are constructed from the World Bank’s Bank
Regulation and Supervision Database according to the methodology in Barth et al. (2001). We
use values from the second and third waves to capture the situation in the years 2003–2004 and
2005–2007, respectively (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008).
21However, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Mart́ınez Peŕıa (2007) point out that the distinction
between branches and subsidiaries has become increasingly blurred in practice. Parent banks have
begun to use “ring-fencing” provisions to limit the responsibility of their branches, too. As host
countries are likely to differ in the degree to which they allow the negotiation of such provisions,
those with more stringent capital regulations might also be more inclined to demand from parent
banks that they support their branches. Then, the impact of CAPITAL on overweighting would
also work through the channel of branches.
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requirements. In the Basel II regulations, market disclosure features as the third
pillar.
We investigate further banking regulations by including ENTRY, the Entry into
Banking Requirements Index. This quantifies the restrictiveness of the requirements
that banks incorporated in the destination country have to meet in order to obtain
a banking licence. Higher index values indicate stricter requirements. These include
whether it is necessary to submit, for instance, organisational charts, financial
projections and information, the prior banking experience of managers and directors,
or the sources of funds for capitalisation.
Moreover, we control for restrictions on other bank activities (RESTRICT ). The
presence of such restrictions may have spillover effects on banks’ decisions to extend
credit and to overweight or underweight countries in their portfolios. We therefore
include an index that captures the restrictions that banks face when pursuing
alternative business in securities, insurance, or real estate or limits to the ownership
of non-financial firms. Higher values of this index are associated with greater
restrictiveness.
Apart from the above variables, we also control for the distance between Germany
and the destination country (DIST ). Distance has long been used in estimating
gravity equations in international trade, and has recently been investigated in the
literature on international holdings and flows of financial assets as well.22 On the
one hand, diversification considerations suggest that the absolute level of holdings or
flows should increase with distance as business cycle correlations tend to decrease
with distance (also see Table 1.3). On the other hand, distance may proxy for
the severity of informational frictions because information flows are generally lower
22See Portes et al. (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) for cross-border trade in equities, corporate
bonds and government bonds, and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) for bilateral bank asset holdings.
35
1. Diversification and Determinants of International Credit Portfolios
between more distant countries.23 In this chapter, we explicitly model diversification
opportunities and evaluate international credit portfolios relative to the benchmark
portfolios containing optimal country weights. Because benchmark portfolios already
account for the distance-diversification nexus, in our regressions DIST should show
up negative if informational frictions increased monotonically with distance.
Finally, we need to control for the presence of financial centres (CENTRE ) because
our lending aggregate also contains lending to insurance companies and other financial
institutions, which are, technically, non-banks.24 Since internationally oriented banks
are highly active in the money markets, the overweighting we observe in financial
centres is partly the consequence of lending to non-bank financial counterparties
located there. However, such overweighting cannot be considered a strategic decision
to seek exposure to a specific country risk.
For full variable definitions and data sources, see Table A.3. Descriptive statistics
and correlations are shown in Tables A.4 and A.5 (all in the Appendix).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Baseline results
As shown in Table 1.5, we first estimate a model with the frictions related to economic
integration and the institutional environment in the host country (column (1)). In
columns (2) and (3), we then analyse a set of key regulations as singled out in the
Basel II framework, before examining the impact of further banking regulations in
the destination country in specifications (4) and (5).
23See, eg, Portes et al. (2001) for a discussion of these two rival hypotheses on the impact of
distance.
24The countries classified as financial centres in our dataset are Ireland, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
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Table 1.5: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FDI 0.502*** 0.516*** 0.522*** 0.494*** 0.521***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.131) (0.125) (0.131)
EURO 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
DIST 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CENTRE 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.040**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
INSTITUTIONS 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CAPITAL 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TRANSPARENCY 0.004* 0.007*** 0.005** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
SUPERVISION 0.007***
(0.002)
ENTRY 0.006*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
RESTRICT 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
GOVT 0.007***
(0.001)
N 3,045 2,958 2,436 2,958 2,871
R2 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.32 0.35
Notes — This table shows baseline regressions of the degree of overweighting, measured on the interval
[−1,+1], on destination countries’ economic integration with Germany and their institutional and regu-
latory environment. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table A.3. Descriptive statistics and
correlations are provided in Tables A.4 and A.5 (all in the Appendix). Marginal effects on INSTITU-
TIONS, CAPITAL, TRANSPARENCY, SUPERVISION, ENTRY, RESTRICT, and GOVT are reported
for a change by one respective sample standard deviation. All estimations include a constant, and are
based on the sample of 18 internationally oriented German banks and the representative set of 35 coun-
tries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per
cent levels, respectively.
We begin by discussing the impact of economic integration on overweighting. Our
first variable, outward foreign direct investment in the real sector (FDI ), turns out
to be significantly positive.25 This is consistent with the view that existing economic
25The coefficient of FDI is interpreted as follows. Taking the magnitude from specification (1)
as an example, an increase in a country’s share in German real-sector outward FDI (relative to
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integration in the real sector promotes financial integration, and that countries that
are more economically integrated with Germany should be characterised by lower
frictions. It is also in line with the hypothesis that banks follow domestic companies
abroad and set up operations in a foreign country in order to retain an already
existing customer base at home (see, eg, Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey
and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
Our second indicator of economic integration, eurozone membership (EURO), is also
positive but insignificant in the baseline specification, which points to a more limited
impact of the euro on credit market integration.26 This contrasts with significant
euro-area biases detected in bond and equity portfolios by Lane (2006) and Jappelli
and Pagano (2008).27 At the same time, detecting a more muted euro effect in bank
lending to the private non-bank sector is consistent with empirical literature which
suggests that the integration of credit markets in the euro area has not kept pace
with that of bond and stock markets (see, eg, Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula,
and Pagano, 2002; Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet, 2004).
Turning to DIST, we find no evidence that countries with a greater distance to Ger-
many are significantly underweighted. If informational frictions increased monotoni-
cally with distance, we would expect more distant countries to be less overweighted,
or more underweighted, relative to the benchmark. Our results are in line with Buch
et al. (2010) who do not detect a significant relationship between distance and the
probability of a country’s being overweighted against a mean-variance benchmark
either.28 Moreover, given that we control for real integration via FDI, the result
the set of 35 countries) by one percentage point is associated with an increase in its degree of
overweighting by roughly 0.5 percentage points.
26As will be shown in the robustness section (see 1.5.3), however, there is somewhat more
compelling evidence of a positive effect of EURO in alternative specifications.
27Further evidence is provided by De Santis and Gérard (2006). Also see Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou, and Peydró (2010) who investigate more closely the channels of the euro’s effects on
financial integration.
28However, this issue is not settled empirically. For instance, Portes et al. (2001), Portes and Rey
(2005), Buch (2005), Heuchemer et al. (2009), and Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) report a negative
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can also be interpreted as mirroring that of Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) who find
that the effect of distance on bilateral bank asset holdings is massively reduced once
goods trade — another form of real integration — is accounted for.
In contrast, the results indicate that the institutional environment does matter in
explaining a country’s overweighting relative to the benchmark. INSTITUTIONS is
positive and highly significant in all regressions, pointing to the importance of such
factors as the protection of property rights or freedom from corruption in fostering the
extension of international credit.29 Our results on German banks’ credit portfolios
therefore add to earlier evidence on international capital and bank flows that stresses
the importance of institutional quality (eg, Alfaro et al., 2008; Papaioannou, 2009).
They are also consistent with the finding that German banks lend more actively to
countries with greater economic freedom (Buch and Lipponer, 2007).
In specifications (2) and (3), we include the variables CAPITAL, SUPERVISION,
and TRANSPARENCY to capture the three pillars (regulatory capital, supervisory
review, market disclosure) of the Basel II framework.30 All three have a significantly
positive impact on the destination country’s degree of overweighting. This suggests
that banking regulations are important in their own right rather than merely a
reflection of general institutional quality as in Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine
(2004).
In more detail, both supervisory toughness (SUPERVISION ) and a higher degree of
information disclosure (TRANSPARENCY ) in the destination country might make
its banks more attractive takeover targets for foreign banks, as suggested by Buch
association between distance and bilateral financial asset holdings, whereas Petersen and Rajan
(2002) show that the role of distance has declined over time.
29Marginal effects for INSTITUTIONS and all remaining variables discussed for the baseline
specifications are reported for a change by one respective sample standard deviation. Hence, in
specification (1), an increase in a country’s general institutional quality by one sample standard
deviation is associated with an increase of its overweighting by roughly one percentage point.
30Note that because of a loss of observations when including SUPERVISION, we only report the
results once in column (3) to show that the other two variables are not materially affected by this.
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and DeLong (2004). Considering that a substantial number of German banks’ foreign
affiliates were not established as de novo entities but acquired in transactions, this
explanation for the overweighting of such countries appears reasonable in our context
as well. Moreover, with regard to TRANSPARENCY, a less literal interpretation
might be that countries which require banks to provide the public with a significant
amount of information tend to apply similar reporting standards to non-banks, too.
In that case, increased transparency on the part of real-sector firms would make
it easier for banks to screen or monitor potential borrowers and thus increase the
attractiveness of the destination country in terms of both cross-border and affiliate
lending.
Countries with stricter capital regulations are overweighted as well, as indicated by
the significantly positive coefficient for CAPITAL. While this again reinforces the
notion that German banks overweight countries with a solidly regulated banking
system, one might also expect strict capital requirements to discourage banks from
setting up operations by requiring them to raise costly equity capital. However,
higher requirements could also give international banks a competitive edge over
domestic banks because they may be better able to raise capital, and at lower costs,
than domestic institutions due to their access to internal capital markets.31 This
might allow them to expand their lending and market share faster than domestic
banks (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). Moreover, it is important to note that
German banks are also subject to relatively strict capital regulation at home. Thus, if
similarity between home and destination country regulations and institutions matters
(see, eg, Lensink, Meesters, and Naaborg, 2008), the result can also be interpreted
31Internal capital markets are particularly advantageous for foreign banks if there are substantial
market frictions, such as information asymmetries. Jeon and Wu (2013), for instance, show that
internal capital markets allow multinational banks to better raise funds in emerging and developed
countries than domestic banks.
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as German banks preferring to be active in countries with a more familiar regulatory
environment.32
Overall, therefore, German banks seem to be drawn to countries with strong institu-
tions and a sound regulatory environment in the banking sector. This is in line with
evidence that restrictions in the destination country are not necessarily a deterrent
to foreign banks (see CGFS, 2010). In addition, our results are consistent more
specifically with the studies by Buch and DeLong (2004) and Buch and Lipponer
(2007), both of which also investigate the impact of supervision and transparency in
determining international bank activity.
Model (4) additionally controls for restrictions on other bank activities (RESTRICT )
and entry requirements (ENTRY ) in the banking sector. Activity restrictions might
reduce the ability of banks to diversify within countries, while entry restrictions
could impose additional costs on entering foreign markets. Whereas RESTRICT is
insignificant, ENTRY is positive and significant. This suggests that banks overweight
countries with more severe restrictions on bank entry. However, according to Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2004), it is countries with strong government influence that
tend to impose higher entry restrictions. We therefore add GOVT, the share of total
bank assets controlled by government-owned banks, in specification (5). The results
show that ENTRY turns negative and insignificant once the impact of government
ownership is accounted for, indicating that the effect of ENTRY on overweighting
comes through GOVT, which is positive and highly significant. This could be due
to foreign — in our case, German — banks possessing a competitive edge over
domestic institutions because the latter are generally less developed and efficient in
countries where government ownership of the banking sector is higher (La Porta,
32At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that we cannot tell apart the impact of level
differences in regulation across destinations from that of differences in the deviations between home
and host country regulations. This is because we use a non-bilateral dataset in this chapter with
Germany as the only home country. Of course, this applies not only to CAPITAL, but to all other
regulatory and institutional variables in our investigation.
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Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Barth et al., 2004). Hence, we do not find
evidence that the level of activity and entry restrictions affects a country’s degree of
overweighting.
1.5.2 Additional country controls
As a first robustness check and to learn more about further factors that influence
the overweighting of countries in German banks’ international credit portfolios, we
augment baseline regression (4) from above by additional country controls. The
results are presented in Table 1.6. The ratios of private credit to GDP (CREDIT )
and stock market capitalisation to GDP (STMKTCAP) control for the size and
development of banking and financial markets, respectively (models (6) and (8)). In
addition, we include the average net interest margin (NIM ) and concentration in
the banking sector (CONC ) to account for competition in the destination country
(models (7) and (8)).
The ratio of private credit to GDP (CREDIT ) has been used as a proxy for the
size and development of banking markets (see, eg, Driessen and Laeven, 2007; Beck,
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine, 2010). We include it for two reasons. First, we have so
far treated all countries equally in that the ability of banks to diversify within markets
has not been considered. More developed banking systems, or deeper markets, might
offer banks better opportunities to do so. Larger banking sectors also offer a greater
potential to generate economies of scale (Buch and DeLong, 2004). The degree of
overweighting should therefore be positively related to CREDIT. Second, banking
sector development is likely to be influenced by both the frictions included in the
regressions and those “residual” frictions that cannot be readily measured. Hence,
controlling for CREDIT can be regarded as a robustness check for the impact of
the frictions we have already investigated. Again, since frictions should be lower in
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Table 1.6: Results including additional country controls
(4) (6) (7) (8)
FDI 0.494*** 0.551*** 0.488*** 0.552***
(0.125) (0.127) (0.123) (0.125)
EURO 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
DIST -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CENTRE 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.043***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
INSTITUTIONS 0.008*** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CAPITAL 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TRANSPARENCY 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ENTRY 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
RESTRICT 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CREDIT 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
STMKTCAP -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
NIM 0.002** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
CONC -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
N 2,958 2,941 2,958 2,941
R2 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31
Notes — This table shows regressions of the degree of overweighting, measured on the interval [−1,+1], on
destination countries’ economic integration with Germany and their institutional and regulatory environ-
ment. The regressions also include additional controls that capture the development of banking and stock
markets as well as banking sector competition in the destination country. For variable definitions and
data sources, see Table A.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Tables A.4 and A.5 (all
in the Appendix). Marginal effects on INSTITUTIONS, CAPITAL, TRANSPARENCY, SUPERVISION,
ENTRY, RESTRICT, and GOVT are reported for a change by one respective sample standard deviation.
All estimations include a constant, and are based on the sample of 18 internationally oriented German
banks and the representative set of 35 countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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countries with developed banking sectors, we would expect the positive coefficient
for CREDIT that we find.
Along with CREDIT, we also include the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP
(STMKTCAP) to control for the level of financial market development. In contrast
to banking sector development, STMKTCAP is significantly negative, indicating that
German banks underweight countries with larger and more developed stock markets.
This is possibly due to a lower demand for bank finance and greater competition
with other non-bank intermediaries and financial markets in these countries (see, eg,
Allen and Gale, 2001; Rosengren, 2002).
While CONC is insignificant, the fact that competition is a potentially important
factor is also borne out by the positive and significant coefficient for NIM. The net
interest margin is often used to measure the operational efficiency and competitive
nature of a banking sector, where higher margins are generally associated with lower
efficiency and less competition (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004). This points into a
similar direction as the earlier result on GOVT, namely that in less developed and
efficient environments there can be opportunities to earn excess returns.
Most important of all, however, the key findings from the baseline specifications
continue to hold in the augmented regressions.
1.5.3 Robustness checks
In the following, we subject our baseline results to a number of robustness tests. All
of those are reported in Table A.6 in the Appendix.
Alternative benchmark weighting schemes
Because portfolio weights from mean-variance optimisation are invariant to the size
of the different economies and their capacity to absorb credit, we correct for credit
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demand by countries’ relative GDP shares. Hence, as the final benchmark weight
we have so far used the unweighted average of the weights from (resampled) mean-
variance optimisation and GDP shares (see 1.3.1). Even though such a “fifty-fifty”
weighting scheme is appealing as a natural starting point, one might still consider it
to be somewhat arbitrary and be worried that our results hinge on this assumption.
We therefore re-run our estimations using alternative weighting schemes that put
more weight on mean-variance optimisation (60 and 70 per cent, respectively), and
less on GDP shares (40 and 30 per cent, respectively). Our findings turn out to be
robust to this, with only EURO becoming significant.
Bringing in the bank level
Our analysis focuses on 18 German banks that are sufficiently large, globally oriented,
and have a business model to suggest that they consider diversifying their credit
portfolios internationally. As a further check, we also re-run our regressions for those
14 banks that are considered systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) by
the Deutsche Bundesbank. While these banks stand out in terms of their size and
foreign exposure, our results remain unchanged for this subset of banks.
More importantly, we also exploit the bank-level dimension of our dataset by including
interaction terms between the country-specific frictions and bank size, proxied by
(log) total assets, to identify whether banks react differently to country-specific
factors.33 The size of a bank can be regarded as a measure of its international
orientation or its experience in different lines of business with a variety of customers.
Larger banks may also have stronger incentives to diversify internationally (Focarelli
and Pozzolo, 2005). On the one hand, deviations from the benchmark induced by
33Note that the fact that coefficients for the level terms change substantially in both magnitude
and significance is due to adding interactions. They reflect the impact on overweighting for a
hypothetical bank with log total assets of zero. Hence, level terms should not be directly compared
to those in the other specifications, whereas the interaction terms are a meaningful guide to potential
differences in bank behaviour.
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a country-specific factor might differ across banks, for instance because it may be
easier for larger banks to overcome informational asymmetries than for smaller banks.
On the other hand, since we already focus on a group of large and internationally
oriented banks, one might not expect major differences in reactions for our sample.
Indeed, we find that the interaction terms are generally insignificant.34 Hence,
country-specific frictions seem to affect all banks in largely equal measure. This also
indirectly supports our choice of bank sample.
Other samples
We also consider two further subsamples. First, we test whether our results hold for
the shortened period 2003 to 2006. Even though the most severe period of the global
financial crisis started in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the
first stage already began in 2007 when, in August of that year, banking flows started
to slow down primarily among developed countries due to increased uncertainty
among banks (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). However, results for this subsample
are very similar to those from the baseline, most probably because we focus on
non-bank credit and the crisis was at first largely confined to the interbank market.
Second, we drop the US and UK from the regressions as these are the two most
overweighted countries in our sample. While there is little change for the institutional
and regulatory variables, the picture is slightly more complex for the economic
integration and distance variables. As in the case of robustness to alternative
weighting schemes, EURO is now significant, which is certainly driven by the
strong overweighting of the non-eurozone countries US and UK. Surprisingly, FDI
turns insignificant in this subsample. On a positive note, though, the coefficient is
significantly positive again in another regression that in addition excludes the year
34The only exception is the interaction of the technical control CENTRE with bank size. Its
coefficient is significantly positive, reflecting that the larger banks in our sample are more active in
financial centres. This seems plausible.
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2007. DIST is negative and significant, suggesting that, for this particular subset,
informational frictions may rise when lending to more distant countries.
Drawing together the evidence from the baseline specifications and from the ro-
bustness checks, there is strong evidence that German banks overweight countries
with both a sound institutional and regulatory environment. On the whole, our
results also indicate that economic integration in the real sector promotes financial
integration in that countries tend to be overweighted that are important destinations
for German non-banks’ outward FDI, too. Moreover, there is somewhat less evidence
of eurozone membership having a major positive influence on overweighting relative
to the benchmark. Finally, there is no compelling evidence overall that more distant
countries are systematically underweighted. Therefore, information asymmetry in in-
ternational banking does not increase monotonically with distance to the destination
country, suggesting that it follows more complex patterns.
1.6 Conclusion
German banks have massively stepped up their foreign exposure over the past two
decades by both an increase in their cross-border activities and the establishment of
branches and subsidiaries abroad. Therefore, major German banks are now heavily
dependent on the development of their foreign assets. However, while business cycles
across the world exhibit notable asynchronicity — which gives rise to potential
diversification opportunities —, the international credit portfolios of German banks
continue to be highly concentrated.
In this chapter, we investigate whether the seeming inconsistency of these observations
is due to the existence of country-specific frictions. More specifically, we ask which
geographical, institutional, and regulatory variables drive a wedge between the
potential and the effective risk and return in foreign lending and thereby shape
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the portfolios that we observe. To this end, we construct a bank-country panel
for the period from 2003 to 2007 on the basis of the External Position Reports of
German Banks, a unique dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. For large,
internationally oriented German banks and a representative set of 35 countries from
all regions of the world, we compare banks’ actual international credit portfolios to
mean-variance based benchmark portfolios that we could expect to observe in the
absence of country-specific frictions.
The results show that institutions and banking regulations are important determi-
nants of the international credit portfolios of German banks. In particular, German
banks tend to overweight those countries against our benchmark that have more
developed institutions, stricter capital regulations, transparency in the banking
sector, and stronger supervision. Furthermore, destinations which are characterised
by a higher level of economic integration vis-à-vis Germany in the real sector are
overweighted as well. Eurozone membership also introduces some bias towards those
countries that have introduced the common currency. However, there is no com-
pelling evidence that information asymmetries increase monotonically with distance
since more distant countries are not systematically underweighted.
Overall, German banks’ international credit portfolios do not seem to be shaped
by factors that cannot change over time. Instead, deviations from our benchmark
are primarily due to factors within the hands of policy makers. Therefore, changes
and improvements of institutional and regulatory frameworks across the globe may
reduce the overweighting or underweighting of countries relative to the benchmark.
Although such changes would arguably take time, there is thus reason to believe
that they could help increase the international integration of banking markets in the
future.
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Chapter 2
Credit Ratings and Cross-Border
Bond Market Spillovers*
2.1 Introduction
Ever since tensions began to surface in the eurozone in late 2009, the announcements
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the creditworthiness of member states have
continuously made the headlines and rattled financial markets. In particular, while
not specific to the ongoing crisis, the notion that rating actions pertaining to one
country might have a major impact on the yields of other countries’ sovereign bonds,
too, has regained the attention of policy makers. In fact, concerns over so-called
negative spillover effects have been running so deep that the European Commission
was at one stage considering a temporary restriction on the issuance of ratings under
exceptional circumstances (Financial Times, 2011). This provides the background
for why the Commission has just recently set up stricter rules for the agencies. In
particular, CRAs are now only allowed to issue three ratings for European Union
*This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Zabel.
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member states’ sovereign debt at pre-defined dates every year (European Union,
2013).
These considerations carry two major assumptions on the behaviour of sovereign
bond markets in the wake of rating announcements. The first assumption is that,
when a rating announcement is made for one country, there exist significant spillover
effects on other countries’ sovereign bond markets. Conditional on their existence,
the second assumption posits that such spillovers must, in one way or another,
be unwarranted to merit an intervention by the state. In more technical terms,
it suggests that spillovers are unrelated to economic fundamentals. While both
assumptions are highly policy-relevant and therefore deserve close scrutiny, they are
not straightforward to test.
This chapter sets out to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects
of sovereign rating announcements, and to establish the economic conditions under
which those effects are strongest, or which countries are affected most. To this
end, we collect an extensive dataset which comprises a complete history of both
the sovereign rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and
Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to 73 countries between
1994 and 2011. The dataset contains substantial variation as it covers both crisis
and non-crisis periods as well as a broad set of developed and emerging countries
across all continents.
Crucially, the variation allows us to pursue a novel empirical strategy to identify
potential spillover effects. More precisely, we perform an explicit counterfactual
analysis which pits bond market reactions to small revisions in an agency’s assessment
of a country’s creditworthiness against bond market reactions to all other, more
major changes. As explained below, this not only helps us get around the problems
associated with a classic event-study approach in a spillover context. It also does
not require the additional assumptions made by a number of papers.
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A traditional event-study procedure, where bond market movements in an estimation
window serve as the counterfactual for bond market reactions in the event window,
is suitable in principle but, in a spillover context, places too high demands on the
necessary non-contamination of the estimation window. This is because, if one
entertains the possibility of cross-border spillovers after rating announcements, each
country’s bond yields are potentially affected by any sovereign rating change in the
world. The estimation window can therefore only be considered uncontaminated if
no such change has occurred anywhere. As the number of instances where this can
be ensured is extremely low, the classic event-study approach appears ill-suited to
thoroughly identify spillover effects. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on a pooled
cross section of short event windows, in which small changes of the actual rating
serve as the counterfactual for larger changes.
While some papers also investigate spillovers in a pooled cross section framework,
their analyses do not postulate an explicit counterfactual, as we do.1 Instead, they
rely on a “comprehensive credit rating” which combines two different types of rating
announcements — actual rating changes and watch, or review, changes — into
a single scale. Their identification therefore depends on rather strong additional
assumptions on the relative informational content of reviews and ratings. We,
however, focus solely on the class of actual rating changes. In detail, we test whether
a country’s sovereign bonds react more heavily to upgrades or downgrades elsewhere
when those are “large” — ie, when the actual rating changes by two notches or more.
The group of “small” one-notch changes serves as the counterfactual during that
exercise. At the same time, we explicitly allow for differences in the informational
content of sovereign rating changes by controlling for watch listings that may build
anticipation in the market. Moreover, we are also able to account for the fact that
1See Gande and Parsley (2005), Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes
(2012), and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).
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an announcement is often followed by a similar one from a different agency soon
after, which may further influence the reception of the later announcements.2
Our findings on the existence of cross-border spillover effects point to an important
asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of ratings. On the one hand,
we find significant spillovers in the wake of sovereign rating downgrades, which turn
out to be robust to a number of tests. On the other hand, reactions to upgrades
appear to be much more muted, if anything.
We then investigate to what extent spillovers are driven by country characteristics.
Importantly, we find that spillovers from downgrades tend to be significantly more
pronounced for countries within the same region. We proceed by testing whether this
can be explained by bilateral trade linkages, financial integration, or fundamental
similarities between countries but, even after controlling for these factors, we continue
to find that belonging to a common region amplifies cross-border spillover effects.
Note that a limit to the amount of fundamentals that can be measured implies that
no study can by design “prove” that negative spillovers are unwarranted in some way.
At the same time, however, our findings do not suggest that policy makers’ concerns
over countries being found “guilty by association” can be dismissed out of hand.
This chapter is related to a broad strand of literature that investigates the effects
of sovereign rating announcements on different segments of the financial markets.
The most common exercise is to conduct an event study gauging the direct impact
of rating changes on the bonds issued by the country concerned. However, there
is also a substantial body of research analysing the reaction of the country’s stock
and, more recently, of its credit default swap (CDS) market. As a general result,
this literature finds a strong and significant impact of sovereign rating downgrades,
while upgrades have an insignificant or more limited impact (see, eg, Cantor and
2To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider such interactions between the major
CRAs in identifying spillover effects.
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Packer, 1996; Larráın, Reisen, and von Maltzan, 1997; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999;
Brooks, Faff, Hillier, and Hillier, 2004; Hooper, Hume, and Kim, 2008; Hill and Faff,
2010).
Moreover, in recent years a growing body of research has specifically studied whether
sovereign rating changes also lead to spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign
bonds. Generally speaking, the literature affirms the existence of such spillovers,
meaning that a rating action on one country is found to significantly affect the
sovereign bond prices of other countries (eg, Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Arezki,
Candelon, and Sy, 2011; De Santis, 2012). Some studies also point out that spillovers
are not limited to sovereign debt markets but that rating changes also affect foreign
stock and exchange markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Arezki et al., 2011;
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012). Regarding a potential asymmetry in the spillover
effects of negative and positive rating events, the results of the literature so far
remain inconclusive. Whereas Afonso et al. (2012) find spillovers to matter most for
downgrades, with little or no effects of sovereign upgrades, Ismailescu and Kazemi
(2010) find positive rating events to have a greater spillover effect on foreign CDS
prices than negative ones.
With the exception of Gande and Parsley (2005), these studies focus either on spillover
effects during specific regional crisis episodes3 or on an otherwise homogeneous
sample of countries only, such as emerging countries (Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2002; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). In addition to some of the shortcomings already
mentioned, this leaves open the question to what extent their findings are of more
general relevance.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset
and highlight some important characteristics of rating announcements. Section 2.3
3See Arezki et al. (2011), Afonso et al. (2012), and De Santis (2012) for the eurozone crisis,
and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.
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discusses the estimation strategy for identifying cross-border spillovers. Section 2.4
presents our empirical results and discusses their interpretation. We end with a brief
conclusion.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 The dataset
For our study, we compile a broad dataset of the yields of publicly traded sovereign
bonds at daily frequency. The dataset starts in January 1994 and ends in December
2011. Since for many countries data are only available after 1994, we add those
countries’ sovereign bonds as soon as reliable information becomes available. Whereas
our dataset only comprises sovereign bonds issued by 27 countries in 1994, this number
increases to 74 countries towards the end of our sample period. This reflects both the
increased financing needs of sovereigns and the growing prevalence of bond issuance,
as opposed to bank financing, over the last 20 years. While for 1994 sovereign
bond yields are mostly available for developed countries, the availability of emerging
market bond yields picks up heavily over our sample period. Towards the end of
the period, emerging markets even account for the bulk of sovereign bonds in the
sample. Figure 2.1 illustrates the increasing scope of our dataset over time.
In order to consider a broad spectrum of sovereign bonds, our sample draws on
data from different sources. Our preferred data source is Bloomberg, from which
we use generic 10-year yields for up to 33 countries. If data are not available on
Bloomberg, we supplement them with yields from Datastream’s 10-year Government
Bond Benchmark Index, ensuring that this does not induce structural breaks in the
series. Since sovereign bond availability for emerging markets is quite limited both
on Bloomberg and on Datastream, we also use data from the JP Morgan Emerging
Markets Bond Index Global (henceforth EMBI Global, see JP Morgan, 1999). While
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Figure 2.1: Number of sovereign bonds in the dataset
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sovereign bond
sample between 1994 and 2011, highlighting a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over
time. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
bonds included in the EMBI Global have to fulfil strict requirements regarding the
availability of reliable daily prices, the average maturity of a country’s bond index
can vary remarkably from that of the other two sources. We therefore control for
maturity in all regressions. Table B.1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of
the sovereign bond market data included in our sample.
For the purpose of our later analysis, we compute sovereign bond spreads. The
spread is the differential of the country’s sovereign bond yield over that of a US
Treasury bond of comparable maturity. We use 10-year maturities where possible,
which is the case for the developed economies and some emerging markets. For the
other emerging economies, we rely on the EMBI Global data. As those correspond
to different maturities (depending on the average maturity of eligible instruments a
country has issued), we obtain the relevant US Treasury yields by interpolating from
the closest published yield curve rates.
Information on sovereign ratings comes from the rating agencies’ websites and
includes daily information both on rating changes and on sovereign watch listings by
any of the “Big Three” (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch) from 1994 to 2011. We
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Figure 2.2: Number of rated countries
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sample of countries
rated by at least one of the major rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch) between 1994 and
2011, with a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries are classified
according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
choose the year 1994 as a natural starting point for our sample period since Fitch
only started to assign sovereign ratings in that year. Like the number of publicly
traded sovereign bonds, the scope and composition of countries rated by the “Big
Three” changes quite substantially during our sample period. While in 1994 only 34
sovereigns were rated by at least one of the agencies, this number had increased to
98 countries by 2011 (see Figure 2.2).
2.2.2 Characteristics of rating announcements
Over the sample period, we are able to consider a total of 1,097 rating changes, 635
of which were upgrades and 462 downgrades. Table B.2 in the Appendix provides a
regional breakdown. In general, one can observe a significant increase in the number
of sovereign credit ratings during our sample period, particularly in emerging market
countries.
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, rating activity is not evenly distributed over time but,
especially for downgrades, shows some hefty peaks during specific episodes of crisis.
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Figure 2.3: Rating actions over time
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Notes — This figure shows upgrades and downgrades of developed and emerging economies made by
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Countries are classified according to the
IMF World Economic Outlook.
Whereas in “normal times”, downgrades tend to be relatively scarce, a severe increase
can be observed in the context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (affecting mostly emerging
countries plus South Korea and Hong Kong) and following the 2008–2011 financial
and European debt crises (where for the first time advanced economies were exposed
to downgrades at a large scale). This means that similar announcements tend to
cluster around certain time periods.
In addition, it is an important stylised fact that the downgrading of a country is
frequently followed by yet another downgrade announcement for that same country
soon after. This is all the more probable because there is a strong overlap in country
coverage by the “Big Three”. Almost all countries in our sample are rated by more
than one agency only and most are even rated by all three (70 out of 98 countries at
the end of 2011). Hence, in what we term within-clustering, different agencies may
make the same announcement for a given country in short succession or even on the
same day. Figure 2.4 illustrates this issue by plotting the cumulative distribution
function and summary statistics of the number of days between similar rating actions
on the same country. As can be seen, clustering is particularly pronounced for
downgrades. In around five per cent of all cases, a downgrade on a country is
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Figure 2.4: Clustering of rating announcements
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followed by another downgrade on that country within just one day. For example, in
the course of the Asian crisis, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s all downgraded
South Korea’s credit rating on successive days between 25 and 27 November 1997.
Similarly, during the ongoing European debt crisis, Fitch issued a downgrade for
Greece on 8 December 2009. One week later, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the
country as well, as did Moody’s yet another six days later.
The presence of clustering might be of crucial importance when examining the
spillover effects from a rating announcement since its informational content is likely
to vary depending on whether it has been announced in isolation or just a few days
after a similar announcement by another agency. Not to control for these cases could
seriously bias estimation results for the impact of rating announcements on sovereign
bond markets.
Clustering across countries may matter, too. When CRAs change the rating of a
number of different countries in the same direction simultaneously, one needs to
control for the fact that some countries will then be both “non-event” and event
countries. Otherwise, one might erroneously detect spillovers across sovereign bond
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markets when, in fact, one is looking at own effects of ratings. This is all the more
important if the countries concerned share a common trait which leads CRAs to
make simultaneous announcements in the first place, as appears to have happened
on 3 October 2008 when Fitch downgraded Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.4 It is
therefore a major advantage of our dataset that it enables us to explicitly take into
account prior and parallel rating actions by other CRAs and on other countries.
Similarly, the informational content of a rating change might be conditional on
whether it was preceded by the respective country being put on a watch list. As the
literature on the effects of rating announcements on the refinancing conditions of
the very same country shows (eg, Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012),
rating changes are often preceded by a similar change in the market’s assessment
of sovereign risk, especially when countries have been put “on watch”, or “review”,
before.5 Ignoring these anticipation effects risks underestimating bond market
reactions to a sovereign rating action. Since our dataset includes all sovereign watch
listings by the “Big Three”, we can directly control for a country’s watch list status
and mitigate potential problems with anticipation.
2.3 Identifying sovereign spillovers
2.3.1 Counterfactual choice and estimation strategy
The existence of rating spillover effects in the sovereign debt market requires, by
definition, that the announcement by a CRA on the creditworthiness of one country
(event country) impact significantly on the bond yields of another (non-event country).
Yet, the mere observation of a change in non-event country yields when an event-
4Other examples may be seen in Standard & Poor’s downgrade announcements for South Korea
and Taiwan during the Asian crisis on 24 October 1997, or in Fitch lowering the ratings of Estonia,
Ireland, Latvia, and Lithuania on 8 April 2009.
5In the following, we use the two terms interchangeably. While Standard & Poor’s and Fitch
issue watch listings, in the Moody’s terminology those are called “reviews”.
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country announcement is made does not suffice to establish a causal relation because
non-event country yields might have changed regardless. Hence, the key issue in
identifying potential spillover effects is to find a suitable counterfactual.
We cannot apply the procedure traditionally used in event studies on direct an-
nouncement effects, however. This strand of literature focuses on, for instance, the
bond yield response of a sovereign that has been downgraded. In this framework,
effects are identified by the existence of abnormal returns, meaning that around the
announcement (event window), returns are significantly different from normal, as
estimated over a longer time frame before the announcement (estimation window).
In order to be a reasonable guide to normal returns, the estimation window has to
be chosen such that other events with a potentially significant impact on returns are
excluded (see, eg, MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, the counterfactual for gauging
the impact of rating announcements is “no rating change”. While this represents a
challenge in direct announcement studies already, which focus on countries in isola-
tion, the identification of spillover effects based on this counterfactual is essentially
impossible.
The reason is that, in a spillover context, we would require that there be no announce-
ments on any rated country within the estimation window.6 There is obviously
a trade-off between the length of that window and the number of announcements
eligible for inclusion in the estimation. However, even at a 30-day length commonly
used in sovereign event studies, which is towards the shorter end of the event-study
literature more generally, only 23 upgrades would be eligible, and 36 downgrades.
6The universe of all rated countries is the relevant benchmark when analysing potential spillover
effects in this framework. Of course, if we only required the estimation window to be free of
announcements pertaining to the non-event country, the number of events eligible for inclusion
would increase substantially. However, this would amount to assuming from the outset that only
direct effects, as opposed to spillover effects, could possibly matter, which would defy the purpose
of the investigation.
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We therefore pursue an identification strategy that does not rely on “no rating
change at all” as its counterfactual, but which discriminates between rating changes
according to their severity. More precisely, rating changes of a single notch serve as
the counterfactual for more severe changes of two notches or more.7 This approach
is implemented in the following estimation equation, which we run on upgrades and
downgrades separately:
∆Spreadn,t = α + β · LARGEe,t +RatEnve,n,t · γ +Othere,n,t · δ + ωe,n,t .
The dependent variable ∆Spreadn,t is the change in non-event country n’s bond
spread vis-à-vis the United States over the two-trading-day window [−1,+1] around
the announcement on day 0 of a change in the rating of event country e (6= n). The
event window length accounts for the fact that by the time a CRA announces a
rating change on day 0, markets in some parts of the world may have already closed
(asynchronous trading). Hence, any impact on those would not materialise before day
+1, and would go undetected using a shorter [−1, 0] window. The same argument
applies to rating announcements made after the exchange has closed in the country
concerned, which we cannot distinguish from those made during trading.8
The key regressor in identifying possible spillover effects is LARGEe,t, a dummy that
takes on a value of one if e’s rating is changed by two notches or more, and zero
otherwise. We thereby treat rating changes of two notches or more as one single
group. This is due to the distribution of the severity of upgrades and downgrades in
our sample, which is shown in Figure 2.5.
The vast majority of rating announcements result in a one-notch change in a country’s
rating. Beyond that, we observe a significant amount of events only for changes of
7See Table B.3 in the Appendix on the mapping of CRAs’ letter ratings into a linear 17-notch
scale.
8CRAs have made post-trading announcements during the eurozone crisis, for instance (Financial
Times, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2012). In financial markets more generally, information which is
deemed highly relevant is frequently released when exchanges are closed in order to limit or smooth
the impact on prices.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of rating changes
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes, measured on a 17-notch scale
(see Table B.3 in the Appendix). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635
upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
two notches, while changes of three notches or more occur only very rarely. Therefore,
we do not include separate dummy variables for the latter categories but group all
rating changes of two notches or more into a single bin.
In this framework, positive (negative) spillover effects are equivalent to a drop (rise)
in the spreads of country n which is significantly more pronounced in response to
a two-or-more-notches upgrade (downgrade) of country e than to a single-notch
one. We would then expect β to be significantly negative (positive) in the upgrade
(downgrade) regressions.
This counterfactual choice also has implications for the estimation technique. Since
we do not use “no change” as the counterfactual (due to the estimation window
problem outlined above), we identify spillover effects in a cross-section of upgrades
and downgrades rather than in a true panel setup.9 We estimate the model by OLS.
At this point, it seems important to address some potential concerns about a possible
endogeneity of the large-change dummy. The implicit assumption in the above design
is that the rating announcement and its severity are not systematically related to
9Thus, t denotes generic rather than actual time and can be thought of as indexing the different
rating events.
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other spread-relevant information in the event window. Otherwise, LARGE and the
error term ω would be correlated, and β would be biased.
One concern might be, for instance, that CRAs downgrade a country instantaneously
in reaction to “bad news” and do so by more notches for “particularly bad news”.
Note that an instantaneous response to other spread-relevant information per se
would not induce any endogeneity in our framework whereas “fine-tuning” the severity
of rating changes, conditional on an immediate response, clearly would. Hence, we
demonstrate that there is very little to suggest instantaneous-response behaviour on
the part of CRAs to begin with, and that endogeneity is therefore not a major issue
in this regard. We would like to stress two points in particular.
Restricting the event window to two days already goes a long way towards alleviating
the problem by limiting the amount of information that might potentially correlate
with the large-change dummy. In other words, the scope for other relevant news to
incite an immediate reaction from CRAs is rather small, even if such behaviour was
characteristic of rating agencies and their announcements.
In addition, the proclaimed practice and a corresponding body of empirical literature
suggest otherwise. The agencies state a preference for stable ratings (see, eg, Cantor,
2001; Cantor and Mann, 2003, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2010), intending to announce
a change only if it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. This “through the
cycle” approach contrasts with a “point in time” approach in that cyclical phenomena
should not, in themselves, trigger rating changes. If CRAs actually pursued a stable
rating policy, the fact that cyclical and permanent factors are difficult to disentangle
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2010) should imply some delay between new
information becoming available and an ensuing change in the credit rating. Empirical
evidence for corporate bond rating indicates that this practice is indeed followed,
thus reducing the timeliness of rating changes (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Liu, Jones,
and Gu, 2011), and that the CRAs are “slow” in processing new information (Löffler,
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2005). This perception has also been expressed in investor surveys (Association
for Financial Professionals, 2002; Baker and Mansi, 2002). Moreover, Sy (2004)
notes for the sovereign sector that it may simply be concerns about rating changes
precipitating significant increases in borrowing costs or outright crises which make
CRAs opt for somewhat less timely announcements.
A second concern might be biases arising from differences across agencies in a pooled
setup, as pointed out by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).10 Suppose, for example,
that the large rating changes in our sample stemmed primarily from an agency in
whose judgments the market placed more trust. Then, by pooling the announcements
of Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, we would be picking up differences in the
credibility of these CRAs rather than identifying spillover effects across sovereign
bond markets. However, Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows that this is not very likely,
in particular for downgrades where changes of two notches or more are distributed
quite evenly across agencies: 32 for Standard & Poor’s, 46 for Moody’s, and 30 for
Fitch.11 We are therefore confident that our approach provides a sound identification
of spillover effects.
2.3.2 The rating environment
The rating environment may play an important role for the bond market reaction
to an upgrade or downgrade announcement. Our regressions therefore control for
a number of different rating variables, contained in RatEnve,n,t. For example, the
spillover potential of a rating action might depend on the creditworthiness of the
event country, which we proxy by the rating it held with the announcing CRA on
the day before (InitRate,t). We also include the absolute difference between the
10At the same time, the authors acknowledge that studies using pooled data (eg, Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2002; Sy, 2004) constitute the norm in the literature as opposed to examining rating
changes by CRAs separately.
11While the picture is not quite as unambiguous for upgrades, we have already stressed in the
introduction that those results should be taken with more of a grain of salt (see next section).
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event country’s initial rating and that of the non-event country (∆InitRate,n,t). This
is because one might expect bilateral effects to differ depending on how similar
countries are in terms of creditworthiness.
In addition, it is well established in the literature that the impact of rating announce-
ments may vary according to whether they have been anticipated by the market (eg,
Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ismailescu and Kazemi,
2010). One potentially important and convenient measure of such anticipation is
whether the actual rating action has been foreshadowed by a CRA putting the
respective country on watch, or review (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Afonso
et al., 2012). Hence, we add a dummy that takes on a value of one if a review in the
indicated direction has been ongoing at the time of the upgrade or downgrade, and
zero otherwise (OnWatche,t).
Introducing an explicit control variable differs from Gande and Parsley (2005),
who amalgamate a country’s watch status into a “comprehensive credit rating”.
More precisely, for any given day their measure is defined as the country’s actual
letter rating on a 17-notch scale, raised (lowered) if the country is on review for an
upgrade (downgrade). Presumably due to the counterfactual issue discussed in 2.3.1,
Gande and Parsley (2005) then focus on those days as events on which there is a
non-zero change in the comprehensive credit rating. However, this identification
crucially involves additional assumptions on how changes in review status and actual
rating changes relate to one another quantitatively. Furthermore, one might argue
that, despite the potential anticipation effects of watch listings, the latter are not
qualitatively the same as actual rating changes. In any case, our much larger sample
allows us to avoid those assumptions. We focus instead on the class of actual rating
changes and their relative strengths only while controlling for anticipation through
watch listings. This should provide for a cleaner identification of spillover effects.
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Moreover, we have shown in 2.2.2 that similar announcements by different CRAs tend
to cluster around certain dates, and that this is particularly true for rating downgrades.
We account for potential clustering within countries by a variable which captures the
number of similar announcements made for a particular country by other agencies
over a 14-day window before the respective event (SimActsWdwEvte,t). For clustering
across countries, ie one or more CRAs changing the rating of more than one country in
the same direction simultaneously, we include the number of similar announcements
made on the same day for the “non-event” country (SimActsDayNonEvte,t).
Finally, we add the volatility measure for the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index in the
United States (VIXt) to control for the “global market sentiment” in which the rating
announcement is made. One might, for instance, imagine that in more turbulent
times (ie, in which volatility is high) borrowing conditions deteriorate across the
board, so that spreads over the event window would be more likely to increase in
any case. In that sense, VIXt can be regarded as a technical control, which also adds
a genuine time component to the pooled cross sections.
Definitions and sources of the above variables are provided in Table B.4 in the
Appendix. In addition, all regressions include the vector Othere,n,t which contains a
fixed set of controls, such as event and non-event country dummies. Importantly,
we also account for common time effects in the pooled cross sections through the
inclusion of year dummies. These capture global macroeconomic trends which might
be reflected in the yields of US Treasuries and, hence, spread changes. For instance,
there may be a stronger tendency for investments to flow into the US in some
years due to a (perceived) “safe haven” status, or a “global savings glut” that has
been discussed for the early 2000s. Moreover, each regression includes the following
technical controls: the maturity of non-event country bonds in levels and squares to
account for different positions on the yield curve, a dummy for EMBI Global bond
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yields, and a dummy for spread changes that need to be measured over weekends
(as those correspond to longer intervals in terms of calendar days).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Existence of cross-border spillover effects
Table 2.1 shows baseline estimation results on the existence of cross-border effects for
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. We start with a parsimonious specification
in column (1), which only contains our main variable of interest, the large-change
dummy LARGE and initial ratings. We then control for potential anticipation effects
from watch listings as well as clustering within and across countries in specification
(2). Finally, specification (3) also accounts for global market turbulence, or risk
aversion.
The key result is that the large-change dummy has the expected sign for both
upgrades (ie, negative) and downgrades (ie, positive), and that it is highly significant
in both cases. Moreover, this finding appears to be remarkably robust as the
coefficient on LARGE is very stable and retains its significance across specifications.
Comparison of the absolute coefficients, however, indicates an asymmetry in the
spillover effects induced by upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Downgrades of
two notches or more are associated with an average spread change over the event
window which exceeds that of one-notch downgrades by about two basis points. In
contrast, large upgrades are associated with spread changes that are roughly 1.2
basis points below those of one-notch upgrades. The asymmetry is also reflected in
the lower significance levels for upgrades despite a larger number of rating events
and observations. To further corroborate this, we confirm in a separate regression
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that the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades are statistically different
from each other (see Table B.5 in the Appendix).12
Asymmetries in the reactions to positive and negative events have frequently been
documented in the literature. For instance, Gande and Parsley (2005) find for a
1990s sample of developed and emerging countries that negative rating events in one
country affect sovereign bond spreads in others whereas there is no discernible impact
for positive events.13 Recently, however, there has also been evidence of symmetric
spillover reactions to sovereign rating announcements in the foreign exchange market
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or even that positive announcements in emerging
countries have both stronger direct and spillover effects in sovereign CDS markets
(Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Turning to the rating-environment controls, neither the initial rating of the event
country just before the rating announcement nor the difference in initial ratings
between event and non-event country seem to play a role in terms of spillover effects.
Both coefficients are far from significant across specifications. Previous evidence
on this has been inconclusive. While Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) and Ferreira
and Gama (2007) detect stronger spillover effects in the foreign exchange and stock
markets, respectively, for event countries with lower initial ratings, Gande and Parsley
(2005) find the opposite for bond market reactions (to sovereign downgrades).
We do find some evidence, though, that the impact of an actual rating change on
spreads depends on whether it has been foreshadowed by a watch listing. The corre-
12To this end, we pool all rating changes and replace the event-window spread changes for
upgrades with their negative values for the sake of comparison. We then add a downgrade dummy
(taking on a value of one for downgrades, and zero for upgrades) to all specifications both in levels
and as interactions with the other explanatory variables. The interaction term of LARGE with the
downgrade dummy is positive and highly significant throughout, pointing to statistically significant
differences in the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
13Similar results have been obtained regarding the direct effects in sovereign bond and CDS
markets (Larráın et al., 1997; Afonso et al., 2012), mirroring a well-established finding from event
studies on bond, stock, and CDS returns in the corporate sector (eg, Hand, Holthausen, and
Leftwich, 1992; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Steiner and Heinke, 2001; Norden and Weber, 2004).
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sponding dummy, OnWatch, is signed as expected for both upgrades and downgrades,
yet there is again an asymmetry: the control variable turns out insignificant in all
upgrade specifications but significant at almost the five per cent level for downgrades
(specification (2) in Panel B). A possible explanation for this is given by Altman and
Rijken (2007). They point out that watch listings partially ease the tension between
the market’s expectation of rating stability and the demand for rating timeliness.
This suggests that watch listings contribute to the anticipation of actual rating
changes. Given that investors tend to be more concerned about negative news, watch
listings should be more important in building anticipation for downgrades than for
upgrades. Figures from our dataset support this notion. While about a third of all
downgrades are preceded by a watch listing, so are only 15 per cent of all upgrades.
Finally, it has often been noted that there is an incentive to leak good news (eg,
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Gande and Parsley, 2005;
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Christopher, Kim, and Wu, 2012), so the relevance
of watch listings in building anticipation is conceivably much lower in the case of
upgrades. We interpret the fact that our results are consistent with this literature as
reassuring in terms of the validity of the regression specifications.
Our results also point to the importance of the clustering of rating announce-
ments, especially for downgrades. While the controls for both clustering within
(SimActsWdwEvt) and across countries (SimActsDayNonEvt) are highly significant
in the downgrade regressions, the effect of across-clustering is only marginally signifi-
cant once for upgrades. This appears plausible in light of the stylised facts presented
in 2.2.2 because simultaneous announcements on several countries by one or more
agencies occur much less frequently for upgrades than for downgrades. Moreover, the
coefficients are correctly signed for both upgrades and downgrades, suggesting that
the spread-decreasing (spread-increasing) spillover effects of an upgrade (downgrade)
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are all the more pronounced when one or more upgrades (downgrades) are announced
for the “non-event” country at the same time.
A similar statement regarding the signs cannot be made with the same degree of
confidence for SimActsWdwEvt, which measures the number of upgrades (down-
grades) announced by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective
upgrade (downgrade).14 While we again find strong differences in significance be-
tween upgrades and downgrades as well as opposing signs, one need not necessarily
expect within-clustering to have an additional spread-increasing effect over the event
window for downgrades. Instead, the variable might subsume two opposing effects.
On the one hand, the clustering of downgrades over a short interval could imply
that any announcement is less relevant individually. In that case, one would expect
a negative coefficient. On the other hand, clustering is much more prevalent in crisis
times (see 2.2.2). Thus, SimActsWdwEvt tends to be higher in times of market
turbulence or global risk aversion when spreads against a “safe-haven” investment
like US Treasuries are upward-trending, too (eg, IMF, 2004, 2006; Garćıa-Herrero
and Ort́ız, 2006; González-Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2008). As this is consistent with
a positive sign, the significantly positive coefficients for downgrades suggest that we
may be picking up a substantial turbulence component.
Since the literature provides little guidance on whether this is what is driving our
results, we include the Standard & Poor’s 500 Volatility Index (VIX ), a commonly
used proxy for global risk aversion (De Santis, 2012). As expected, its coefficient
14In choosing the window length, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) who employ a two-week
duration for a comparable control variable. However, using a one-week or three-week window
instead does not alter the conclusions. Moreover, the reader may note that we do not report a
variable capturing similar rating announcements made on the same day by other agencies in our
baseline. This is due to the unattractive property that this variable drops out in the upgrade
regressions since there is not a single event of multiple upgrades of a country on the same day
in our sample. Therefore, in the interest of comparability, we choose not to report downgrade
regressions with that control either. These regressions show, however, that the measure is always
insignificant for downgrades, regardless of whether it is included in addition to, or as a stand-in for,
SimActsWdwEvt. All results are shown in Table B.7 in the Appendix.
71
2. Credit Ratings and Cross-Border Bond Market Spillovers
is positive and significant for both upgrades and downgrades, given the relation
between market turbulence and yield spread drift. Interestingly, the coefficient on
SimActsWdwEvt is still positive but slightly lower than before. This may be due to
VIX picking up some of the turbulence effect previously captured by SimActsWdwEvt.
Hence, there is indeed evidence that clustering may also reduce the spillover relevance
of individual rating events that take place in a period of many similar announcements
by other CRAs.
Finally, we subject our baseline regressions to a number of robustness checks. In
doing so, we focus on downgrades because these are significantly more relevant from
a policy perspective than upgrades and, as will be shown in 2.4.2, the findings on
the latter should be taken with a grain of salt. The results of our robustness checks
are reported in Table B.6 in the Appendix.
First, we address extreme rating events. One might be concerned, for instance, that
grouping all downgrades of two notches or more into a single bin could obscure the
impact of a few very severe rating changes that might be driving our results (see
Figure 2.5). However, this is not the case as dropping downgrades of four notches or
more and three notches or more, respectively, leaves the findings unchanged.
Second, we ensure that the results on negative spillovers are not merely the product
of specific crisis episodes, namely the eurozone crisis of 2010/11 and the Asian
financial crisis of 1997/98. Again, our results appear to be more general as the key
coefficient of interest remains robust to controlling for these two crises.
Third, in 2.3.1 we have already argued that an estimation bias due to different degrees
of trust being placed in the three CRAs is unlikely by pointing to the distribution
of the severity of rating changes across agencies in Figure B.1 (see the Appendix).
However, the figure also shows that Standard & Poor’s stands out as the agency
which is far less likely than the other two CRAs to issue a large downgrade conditional
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on announcing any downgrade at all (only 32 out of 210 negative announcements).
By virtue of their relative rarity, Standard & Poor’s large downgrades might hint
at particularly strong deteriorations in a country’s creditworthiness and thus incite
especially strong reactions as well. It could therefore be a concern that those might
account for our baseline result.15 Yet, controlling for this does nothing to alter the
conclusion of significant cross-border spillover effects of sovereign rating downgrades.
Fourth, in 2.3.1 we have also dwelled quite extensively on literature which suggests
that CRAs do not generally react instantaneously to other spread-relevant informa-
tion. For lack of immediate-response behaviour in the first place, we then reasoned
that it is even more unlikely that the agencies should “fine-tune” the severity of
their rating changes to such information. However, concerns were pointed out to
us that some large downgrades may have been motivated by particularly adverse
spread developments in the run-up to the announcement.16 Note that because we
look at spillover effects on other countries, it is immaterial whether spreads in the
event country also continue their particularly strong increase from prior to such
announcements over the two-day event window. To interfere with our estimation
results and bias the coefficient on LARGE upwards, not only would negative spread
developments in the event country need to be at least partly representative of those
in non-event countries, but spreads in the latter would also need to widen particularly
15Moreover, some studies, such as Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), continue to single out Standard
& Poor’s and ignore other CRAs’ announcements on the grounds that early research into sovereign
credit rating announcements found Standard & Poor’s to be less anticipated (eg, Reisen and von
Maltzan, 1999; Gande and Parsley, 2005). It is worth emphasising, though, that an agency such
as Fitch, for example, only entered the business as late as 1994. Therefore, not only were there
no corresponding rating actions to examine by earlier studies to begin with, but it is also quite
conceivable that part of Standard & Poor’s alleged special position was eroded over time. The
summary of more recent research provided in Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) also suggests that
there is no single agency whose announcements are generally more relevant than those of the other
two CRAs.
16The ratings rationale provided by Moody’s for its four-notch downgrade of Portugal on 5 July
2011 may be viewed as a case in point, which names as the “first driver informing [the] downgrade
... the increasing probability that Portugal will not be able to borrow at sustainable rates in the
capital markets” (emphasis added). One could interpret this to refer to a widening of spreads prior
to the rating change.
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strongly during the event window. Moreover, as a global turbulence component,
VIX should already capture some common component of spread developments across
countries. We nonetheless also run a regression which includes as an additional
control variable the change in the event country’s spread over the 14-day window
prior to the event. While data limitations on event country spreads allow us to do
so for only about 60 per cent of the original downgrades, our key finding continues
to hold.
2.4.2 Spillover channels
After providing evidence for the existence of spillover effects in the sovereign bond
market, in particular for downgrades, we now turn to potential channels of those
spillovers. While the regressions presented so far control for a multiplicity of factors
pertaining to event and non-event countries on their own, they do not — with the
exception of ∆InitRat — account for bilateral characteristics of event and non-event
countries. However, bond market reactions in the wake of rating announcements in
other countries might differ depending on similarities and bilateral linkages, which
may be highly relevant from the perspective of policy makers.
We therefore augment our final baseline specification (column (3) in Table 2.1) by
whether the event and non-event country belong to the same geographical region
(Region), whether they are members of a common major trade bloc (TradeBloc),
and the importance of the event country as an export destination for the non-
event country (ExpImpEvt). We also account for the degree of financial integration
by the event and non-event country’s capital account openness (CapOpenEvt and
CapOpenNonEvt). Finally, we consider the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt)
as well as differences between event and non-event countries in terms of GDP (∆Size)
and trend growth (∆TrendGrowth). Definitions and sources for these variables are
74
2. Credit Ratings and Cross-Border Bond Market Spillovers
also reported in Table B.4 in the Appendix. The estimation results are shown in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
There is again a notable asymmetry between the findings on upgrades and those on
downgrades. This applies to both the results on the potential channels themselves
and to the impact that the inclusion of additional controls has on the robustness
of our baseline findings. Whereas the results for downgrades are highly stable and
intuitive, they paint a more nuanced picture for upgrades.
In more detail, we find consistently that spillover effects in the case of downgrade
announcements are significantly stronger within the same region than to countries
outside it (see Table 2.3). The coefficient on Region has the correct sign, indicating
that borrowing costs increase by up to almost four basis points more for non-event
countries in the same region as the event country than for those outside it. Our
findings appear plausible since countries in the same geographical region are more
likely to share institutional or cultural characteristics and to have important real
and financial links to one another. Apart from fundamental factors, a more mundane
explanation might posit that financial markets simply find non-event countries from
the same region “guilty by association”. The results are also in line with a number
of studies which focus on one or more particular regions from the start (eg, Arezki
et al., 2011; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; De Santis, 2012). Surprisingly, we obtain
positive coefficients for upgrades in Table 2.2 as well, which would suggest that those
are less likely to induce spillovers within than across regions. While one could imagine
that belonging to a particular region does not matter for upgrade announcements
due to an asymmetric perception by investors, the fact that the coefficients are often
significant is not easily rationalised. On a positive note, though, the magnitude for
upgrades is only about a third of that for downgrades — and statistical significance is
also lower. Therefore, in the interest of comparability and as an important economic
control, we retain Region in all specifications.
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The two trade controls, ie common membership in a major trade bloc (TradeBloc)
and the non-event country’s ratio of exports to the event country to domestic GDP
(ExpImpEvt), are signed as expected throughout, pointing to more pronounced
spillover effects for both upgrades and downgrades when such linkages exist, or when
they are stronger. However, they are only mildly significant once for upgrades (see
specification (7) in Table 2.2). Moreover, the stability in magnitude and significance
of Region upon inclusion of the trade variables, in particular for downgrades, seems
to indicate that stronger spillover effects within regions cannot easily be explained
by real linkages.17
Apart from real linkages, we would ideally also like to control directly for bilateral
financial linkages, eg the exposure of non-event country investors to event country
sovereign bonds. Unfortunately, even use of the most comprehensive data from the
IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey leads to a massive reduction in the
number of observations and major selection effects along the time series and country
dimensions. This renders virtually impossible any comparison with the baseline
results.
However, to the extent that trade also captures a notable portion of variation in
bilateral asset holdings, our findings for real linkages also hold for financial linkages.
As shown by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), there is indeed strong evidence that trade
is a powerful determinant of bilateral (bank) asset holdings.18 The disadvantage of
using trade as a proxy for financial linkages, though, is that we cannot discriminate
between the effects of real and financial linkages.
17The fact that the correlation of the two trade variables with the region control is low does not
support multicollinearity as a technical explanation for this result. Moreover, replacing ExpImpEvt
by other proxies for bilateral trade does not change the picture either (see Table B.8 in the
Appendix).
18In addition, through its correlation with FDI, trade may proxy for cross-country bank exposure
since bank lending may follow domestic companies when those set up operations abroad (eg,
Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
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To get an idea of the distinct impact of financial linkages, we therefore approximate
financial integration by the degree of the event and non-event country’s capital
account openness as measured by the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006).19
While this index cannot be used to gauge the effects of bilateral financial linkages, it
is still interesting in its own right to look at and control for level effects. The results
show that the event country’s capital account openness tends to significantly amplify
cross-border spillover effects. Since bonds of financially open countries should be
more likely to be held by foreign investors, this result is highly intuitive.
The evidence on the remaining potential channels is succinctly summarised for
downgrades. In no specification do the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt), its
increment over that of the non-event country (∆Size), or differences in trend growth
between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) turn out to be significant
determinants of the strength of bond market spillovers. At the same time, all results
from the baseline and augmented baseline regressions (columns (1) and (2) in Table
2.3) prove remarkably stable in terms of both magnitude and significance.
This contrasts with the corresponding findings for upgrades. On the one hand, we
obtain a number of interesting results for the size and growth controls. On the
other hand, the augmented regressions raise some doubts on our main variable of
interest, LARGE, in terms of statistical significance. The latter alternates between
specifications and vanishes in some, yet in view of the considerably stronger baseline
results for downgrades, this is not entirely surprising. It merely serves to underscore
the asymmetry that exists between positive and negative rating changes. However,
this also means that the evidence on the potential channels for upgrades should be
taken with a grain of salt.
19We choose this index due to its broad coverage over time, which allows us to maintain
comparability with the baseline results. The index has also been used extensively in recent
literature (eg, Fratzscher, 2012; Hale and Spiegel, 2012; Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2013).
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In this regard, the most interesting result is probably the observation that, given
the event country’s size and initial rating, positive spillovers are larger the smaller
the non-event country relative to the event country (∆Size). The magnitude of the
coefficient suggests that non-event countries which are half (two-thirds) the size of
the event country experience an additional positive spillover effect of about four (two)
basis points, as compared to non-event countries as large as the event country.20
While the effect appears to be relatively small, its direction is still interesting, in
particular when viewed in conjunction with the fact that, across the whole sample,
larger and more highly rated countries induce smaller spillovers (columns (5) to (7)
in Table 2.2). This would be consistent with a world in which positive spillover
effects matter primarily within a group of small developed and emerging countries
but less so within a group of large, developed countries, and in which the latter have
little impact on the former. The insignificance of the absolute difference in trend
GDP growth rates between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) as a
further measure of differences in economic development does nothing to contradict
this interpretation. In view of the generally more ambiguous results for upgrades,
however, we do not wish to overemphasise this point.
2.4.3 Discussion
Our results can be condensed into the following stylised facts. First, there is
strong evidence of statistically significant, negative spillover effects of downgrade
announcements. This result proves highly robust to controlling for anticipation
through watch listings and the clustering of rating announcements. Second, negative
spillover effects are more pronounced among countries in a common region, which
20∆Size is defined as the difference between the event and non-event country’s log GDPs or,
equivalently, the log of the ratio of the two GDP levels. Therefore, a decrease in relative non-event
country size by half (two-thirds) amounts to an increase in ∆Size of about one hundred (fifty) per
cent. With an absolute coefficient of roughly 0.04, the (semi-elasticity) marginal effects therefore
obtain as four and two basis points, respectively.
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cannot be explained by measurable fundamental links and similarities between
countries. Third, reactions to upgrades are, if anything, much more muted than
for downgrades, suggesting important asymmetries in the sovereign bond market’s
treatment of the two types of announcements. Fourth, evidence on the channels
behind positive spillover effects, if any, offers a more complex picture and appears
relatively ambiguous.
Which conclusion to draw from this? To begin with, there is a strong case for the
notion that negative sovereign rating announcements, ie those of most concern to
policy makers, do matter in inducing spillovers across markets. Such is the outcome
of the explicit identification strategy used in this chapter, which demonstrates that,
all other things equal, large downgrades of two notches or more cause larger hikes in
spreads than small one-notch downgrades. This suggests a role for CRAs and their
actions in sovereign bond markets, be it through the revelation of new information on
creditworthiness which acts as a “wake-up call” for investors to reassess fundamentals
in other countries (Goldstein, 1998), or simply by providing a coordinating signal
that shifts expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium (Masson, 1998; Boot,
Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006).
However, a major regulatory focus on the activities of CRAs would also require
negative spillover effects of substantial economic magnitude. In this chapter, we find
the incremental impact of large downgrades to be a little over two basis points, which
may appear limited at first glance. Yet, it is important to note that this does not
represent the total effect that policy makers would be concerned about. This total
effect can be thought of as consisting of a “base effect” that small downgrades have,
compared to a benchmark scenario of no downgrades anywhere, plus an additional
impact for large downgrades — which is what we measure. Of course, the reason we
focus on the latter lies in the impossibility of cleanly identifying the “base effect” of
rating changes unless one rules out the existence of rating-induced spillovers from the
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beginning (see the discussion in 2.3.1). Nonetheless, the total effect is conceivably a
multiple of the one we estimate. Suppose the “base effect” were only twice as large as
the incremental one we measure. Then, the implied total effect would already amount
to approximately six basis points. To put this into perspective, the average sovereign
bond spread vis-à-vis US Treasuries at the time of the downgrade announcements in
our sample is 3.25 per cent, or 325 basis points. While the total effect of downgrades
is relatively small in comparison, one has to bear in mind that governments often
need to refinance large amounts of debt, which magnifies the impact of even small
spread differences. Moreover, there is still a regional effect of up to four basis points
on top of that, suggesting that concerns about negative spillovers in the sovereign
debt market should not be lightly dismissed.
Finally, from a policy maker’s point of view, the finding that the increased strength
of negative spillovers within regions cannot be explained away by measurable linkages
and similarities between countries might also be a cause for concern. Even though
limited data availability precludes an all-encompassing analysis of potential channels,
there is little to suggest that one can comfortably rule out that some countries are
found “guilty by association” with the event country. Moreover, such behaviour on
the part of investors would likely extend to their reactions to news other than rating
announcements. While it is hard to see an obvious remedy, the potential problem
would seem to be much more general and, above all, rooted in investor behaviour.
Hence, it is not clear that putting the primary emphasis on CRAs will prove effective
in this regard.
2.5 Conclusion
Concerns about negative spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of
sovereign rating changes have recently resurfaced on the agenda of policy makers. In
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this chapter, we study the existence and potential channels of such spillover effects.
More specifically, we avail of an extensive dataset which covers all sovereign rating
announcements made by the three major agencies and daily sovereign bond market
movements of up to 73 developed and emerging countries between 1994 and 2011.
Based on this, we propose an explicit counterfactual identification strategy which
compares the bond market reactions to small changes in an agency’s assessment of a
country’s creditworthiness to those induced by all other, more major revisions. In
doing so, we account for a number of factors that might impact on the reception of
individual announcements.
We find strong evidence in favour of negative cross-border spillovers in the wake
of sovereign downgrades. At the same time, there is no similarly robust indication
as to positive spillovers since reactions to upgrades are much more muted at best,
which points to an important asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment
of positive and negative information. Regarding the channels of negative spillover
effects, our results suggest that those are more pronounced for countries within the
same region. Strikingly, however, this cannot be explained by fundamental linkages
and similarities, such as trade, which turn out to be insignificant.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that policy makers’ concerns about negative
spillover effects are not unfounded. In fact, the lack of power of a set of fundamentals
in explaining the added regional component may reinforce, or give rise to, concerns
about the ability of investors to discriminate accurately between sovereigns. This
could also be of more general interest because such behaviour is likely to carry over
to reactions to various kinds of non-CRA news in other markets and sectors, too.
Hence, important though they are, a sole focus on CRAs and their actions might be
missing a bigger picture.
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Chapter 3
Foreign Banks in Emerging
Syndicated Loan Markets*
3.1 Introduction
Foreign banks are a major source of external finance for companies in emerging
markets, and policy makers in these countries have long been concerned about their
behaviour. In particular, due to the generally less stable economic environment
in developing and emerging countries, the stability with which foreign institutions
extend credit looms large on the agenda. Much attention has been devoted by
a host of theoretical and empirical literature to the entry of foreign banks into
emerging banking markets, mostly focusing on Latin America and Central and
Eastern Europe.1
*This chapter is part of a larger research project in collaboration with Christoph Trebesch.
1Issues that have been addressed include the provision of credit to the private sector after
large-scale foreign bank entry (eg, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2008; Beck and Mart́ınez Peŕıa,
2010), whether foreign banks engage in “cherry-picking” and shun small and medium-sized domestic
borrowers (eg, Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998; Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Bonin and Wachtel,
2003; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Clarke, Cull, Mart́ınez Peŕıa, and Sánchez, 2005; Mian, 2006;
Gormley, 2007; Berger, Klapper, Mart́ınez Peŕıa, and Zaidi, 2008), and the impact of entry on
competition and lending rates (eg, Berger, Genay, and Udell, 2000; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel,
2005; Chen and Liao, 2011; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011).
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However, despite a significant increase in the local presence of foreign banks over
the past two decades (see, eg, Clarke, Cull, Mart́ınez Peŕıa, and Sánchez, 2003),
international syndicated loans — in which two or more banks jointly agree to lend
to a borrower — continue to be a major element in the financing mix of emerging
markets. Not only do they account for approximately two thirds of cross-border
flows to emerging countries, but the growth in syndicated loan issuance has also
kept pace with the growth of foreign banks’ local claims (Bank for International
Settlements Consolidated Banking and Securities Statistics). This is highly relevant
from a policy perspective because, in the past, a number of emerging markets have
been subject to “sudden stops”, referring to an abrupt drying-up of capital inflows
into their economies that was often followed by declines in output and a devaluation
of the domestic currency (Calvo, 1998). With syndicated loans representing a large
part of those flows and given the generally quite limited financial resources available
domestically, this chapter asks whether there are differences in behaviour between
foreign banks, or whether they all behave alike. More specifically, is there a group of
foreign banks that participate more reliably in syndicated loan deals in a country
than others?
Strikingly, there is evidence to suggest that there is. I begin by documenting
an interesting pattern observed around 30 sudden stop episodes for the relative
participation in 835 loan syndicates of two groups of foreign banks. While the share
of syndicate members accounted for by banks that already took part in the first ever
deals in a given country (“early participants”) remains constant before and during
the sudden stop incident itself, it increases markedly in the years after the sudden
stop. In contrast, the share of foreign banks that did not participate in one of those
first few deals (“late participants”) tends to rise before the sudden stop, only to drop
substantially while the sudden stop is still ongoing and thereafter. This hints at an
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important discrepancy in behaviour between the two groups in an extremely adverse
economic scenario.
I then proceed to investigate whether this observation holds with regard to changes in
economic conditions more generally, and do so in two steps. In the first step, I analyse
the participation shares of the two groups of foreign banks over the business cycle,
controlling for heterogeneity at both the deal and country levels as well as industry
and time-fixed effects. Considering a total of 5,593 loan deals in 68 emerging and
developing countries, I find that the share of early participants on a syndicate bears a
significantly negative relation to the respective country’s real GDP growth, whereas
the association for late participants is insignificant. This anti-cyclical behaviour on
the part of early participants is consistent with the more specific patterns observed
around sudden stops. In addition, the analysis points to differences in the willingness
to take on longer-term credit risk and particularly exchange rate risk between the
two groups. As indicated by their participation shares, late participants appear more
hesitant than early participants to enter deals that carry longer maturities or deals
that are not signed in a major reserve currency.
In the second step, I build on this analysis, acknowledging that the relative share of
each of the two groups of foreign banks is to some extent a residual of the decision of
the respective other group — and of domestic banks — to join or not join a syndicate.
I therefore model the binary decisions of individual foreign banks whether to join
a given deal in a country. More precisely, I estimate a linear probability model
explaining a bank’s participation probability in terms of its early or late-participant
status. For one thing, this identifies a level effect, which reflects whether there is a
wedge between early and late participants in that the former are generally more likely
to sign up for deals than the latter. Moreover, an interaction term between early
participation and real GDP growth captures whether a deterioration in economic
conditions over the business cycle increases such a potential wedge between the
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participation probabilities of the two groups of foreign banks. Importantly, the
analysis accounts for bilateral linkages between the foreign bank’s home country
and the borrower country, micro-level lending relationships between the bank and
individual borrowers, as well as bank-fixed effects. This enables me to isolate the
effect of early participation that is characteristic of bank-country pairs.
The results show that foreign parent banks belonging to the group of early participants
in a country are significantly more likely to sign up for further syndicated loan deals
than other foreign banks. Their participation probability is approximately 0.9
percentage points higher, which is economically large given an average participation
probability in the sample of about 3.2 per cent. This level effect speaks in favour of
early participation introducing important path dependence into syndicated lending
to emerging markets. Furthermore, the gap in participation probabilities between
early and late participants tends to widen when economic conditions deteriorate.
Both the statistical and economic relevance of this effect, however, turn out to be
conditional on the set of foreign parent banks considered. That is, there is strong
evidence of a major effect once non-Japanese banks are considered only.2 For this set
of parent banks, a one sample standard deviation drop in real GDP growth is linked
to a widening of the wedge between early and late participants’ probabilities of close
to 0.4 percentage points. Hence, there are differences in responsiveness to economic
conditions between the two groups on top of level differences in participation.
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter represents the first investigation of
differential foreign bank behaviour in syndicated lending to emerging markets. Its
main contribution lies in painting a richer picture, which could be relevant for policy
makers who may want to monitor the composition of loan syndicates between early
2Japanese banks have been found in the empirical literature to behave distinctly in other
aspects of international lending (see, eg, Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Mart́ınez Peŕıa, Powell, and
Vladkova Hollar, 2002), which also shows up in the data used in this chapter. I will discuss this in
more detail at the appropriate stage.
89
3. Foreign Banks in Emerging Syndicated Loan Markets
and late participants. At the very least, the results point to the risks that may be
attached to a broadening of the creditor base at the expense of early participants
who appear to be more reliable sources of financing. In terms of what lies behind the
findings, one could argue that involvement in early deals gives banks an edge over
non-participants because these very first deals are an opportunity to gain particularly
profound knowledge of the institutional and legal environment of the country. This
advantage may translate into lower lending costs and lead to higher participation in
more deals on average and under worsening economic conditions.
I am aware of only one similar empirical contribution that distinguishes between
the actions of foreign banks in emerging markets. Focusing on standard bank loans
extended by the local affiliates of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe,
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) find that whereas greenfield affiliates assume a
stabilising role on credit supply during times of crisis, those that were acquired by
a foreign parent bank do not. The findings in this chapter therefore contribute to
filling the gap for syndicated loans as another major element of the financing mix.
Moreover, the chapter is conceptually related to De Haas and Van Horen (2013) who
also look at bank-country pairs in syndicated lending. However, they focus on the
shock to banks’ balance sheets around the collapse of Lehman Brothers and find
that banks did not cut their lending to developed and emerging market borrowers
indiscriminately. Banks instead reduced credit supply by less to countries that were
closer along several dimensions, such as distance or lending experience.3 In this
chapter, I do not so much take the point of view of a given bank as that of a given
emerging market. It is at the country level that economic conditions change and
3Also see Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and Popov and Van Horen (2013), who apply more
coarse country-level distinctions in examining, respectively, the impact of home country banking
crises on home versus foreign lending, and the impact of the euro area sovereign debt crisis on
lending to GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) versus non-GIIPS countries.
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lead to differential reactions across foreign banks, depending on whether the latter
participated in early deals or not.
Other facets of syndicated lending in emerging markets have been examined in
Arteta and Hale (2008), Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2010), and Ağca and
Celasun (2012). These studies relate private sector access and borrowing conditions
to sovereign risk and the structure of sovereign debt in emerging markets. Of those,
the contribution by Arteta and Hale (2008) is closest to this chapter in that the
authors find declines in foreign credit to domestic firms in the wake of sovereign
debt crises. While the latter are in some sense a subset of sudden stop incidents, its
scope is more narrow than in this chapter, and does not distinguish further between
foreign banks. More general motivations for foreign bank activity and differences to
domestic banks across developed and emerging markets are explored by Esty (2004),
Qian and Strahan (2007), and Haselmann and Wachtel (2011). Broadly speaking,
these papers stress the importance of creditor rights and legal enforcement in luring
foreign banks, and the development of domestic financial systems in determining the
dependence on external sources of finance.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides
a background to syndicated loans and their role in the financing mix of emerging
and developing countries. Section 3.3 describes the dataset used in the investigation
and key lending patterns that emerge from it, before documenting the behaviour of
foreign banks around sudden stops. The empirical strategy and results, including
robustness checks, are shown in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, I conclude with a
discussion.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 The syndicated loan contract
Syndicated loans constitute a particular type of debt financing. These are loans
in which two or more banks — or other financial institutions, such as finance or
insurance companies — jointly agree to lend to a borrower. At least one of the banks
typically serves as a “lead arranger” who establishes a relationship with the firm,
negotiates the terms of the contract, and guarantees a certain loan volume within
some price range. On the basis of such a preliminary loan agreement and in return
for a fee, the lead arranger then turns to potential “participants” with information
on the firm in order for them to fund a portion of the loan (Dennis and Mullineaux,
2000).4
Therefore, syndicated loans can be considered a hybrid of traditional bank loans
and capital market instruments, or of commercial and investment banking (Boot,
2000). On the one hand, the lead bank is in charge of screening and monitoring the
borrower, which closely resembles the role of banks as providers of relationship loans
(see, eg, Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). On the other hand,
from the perspective of participant banks, funding part of the deal is often more
akin to buying a bond in the capital markets than to granting a standard bank loan.
3.2.2 Syndicated lending in context
Since the 1960s the market for syndicated loans has become more organised and
increasingly important. Initially serving almost exclusively large multinational
firms, sovereigns, and quasigovernmental entities, over the past two decades the
4In order to incentivise the lead bank to fulfil its screening and monitoring duties properly, it
also retains a share of the loan itself. Also see Sufi (2007) and Chaudhry and Kleimeier (2013) who
provide evidence that, in line with this reasoning, the portion funded by the lead arranger is larger
in the case of more opaque borrowers.
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market has come to provide financing for many medium-sized corporations as well
(Carey and Nini, 2007). Companies from emerging and developing countries have
also significantly increased their borrowing through international syndicated loan
facilities.5
At the same time, liberalisations of the capital account and local banking markets
have further expanded the scope of the (foreign) sources of finance available to
emerging market borrowers. It is therefore informative to briefly put into perspective
the role played by syndicated loans in this financing mix. In essence, firms can borrow
directly from foreign financial institutions in cross-border transactions, including
syndicated loans, or through local branches and subsidiaries maintained by global
banks in the respective emerging market. Figure 3.1 juxtaposes the capital flows
that arise from these transactions against those that arise from syndication activity.
For comparability reasons, Figure 3.1 is based on data compiled by a single institution,
the Securities and the Consolidated Banking Statistics from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), and covers the set of developing countries as defined by the BIS.
For the years 1992 through 2012, Panel A shows the volume of newly signed syndicated
loan facilities involving at least one foreign lender and the flows of other cross-border
funding, which refers to borrowing through the issuance of money market instruments,
bonds, or notes in the international markets. Total cross-border funding is then
defined as the sum of the two.6 Note that flow values for other cross-border funding
have to be approximated by changes of amounts outstanding in the above instruments
on a yearly basis, and that they are not corrected for write-downs or revaluations.
Hence, numbers are quite reliable in tranquil times when only a minor fraction of
claims are subject to write-downs, but less so in times of crisis. Thus focusing on the
relatively calm years up to 2007, Panel A gives evidence of a major role of syndicated
5In this chapter, I often use the term emerging for brevity. Unless stated otherwise, this refers
to both emerging and developing countries.
6In doing so, I follow De Haas and Van Horen (2013).
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Figure 3.1: Syndicated lending to emerging markets in context
Panel A: Syndicated loans and other cross-border flows
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Notes — This figure shows syndicated lending to emerging markets over the 1992–2012 period and compares
it to the dynamics of both cross-border funding (Panel A) and foreign banks’ local claims in emerging
markets (Panel B). In both panels, syndicated loans refer to the volume of newly signed credit facilities
with at least one foreign lender on the syndicate (BIS Securities Statistics, Table 10). Other cross-border
flows are derived from year-on-year changes of the sum of amounts outstanding of international money
market instruments and international bonds and notes (Tables 14a, 14b). The share of syndicated loans
in total cross-border flows, which is the sum of newly syndicated loans and other cross-border flows, is
shown on the right-hand scale of Panel A. Because other cross-border flows are proxied by changes in the
respective stock values and are not corrected for write-downs or revaluations, comparisons are less reliable
in crisis times. This is indicated by the dashed lines around 2001 and 2008, where negative values obtain
for the proxied flows of other cross-border funding, which would understate total cross-border flows and
thus overstate the importance of syndicated loans. In Panel B, local claims refer to local-currency claims
on local residents by the foreign offices of BIS reporting banks (BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics).
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lending, which consistently accounts for roughly two thirds or even more of total
cross-border funding provided to emerging markets.
The opening up of local banking markets has led to substantial entry by foreign
banks into emerging economies, either by setting up greenfield affiliates or by
acquiring erstwhile local banks, and has stirred much debate among policy makers
and academics alike (see, eg, Clarke et al., 2003). A natural question is whether this
trend has marginalised syndicated lending in that the latter may well be relevant
compared to other sources of cross-border funding, but that emerging market finance
may now be almost exclusively a local matter. Panel B in Figure 3.1 suggests this is
not the case. It shows the volume of newly signed syndicated loan facilities from
Panel A next to year-on-year changes in the amounts outstanding of local claims,
again uncorrected for write-downs and revaluations. Because the BIS Consolidated
Banking Statistics only reports claims on local residents by the foreign offices of BIS
reporting banks that are denominated in local currency, the corresponding numbers
in Panel B are likely to somewhat underestimate the total volume of local business.7
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that syndicated loan issuance has kept pace with the
increase in local claims. Overall, syndicated loans must therefore be considered an
important component of the foreign financing mix.
Finally, this might not matter much from the perspective of an emerging market
policy maker were it not for the fact that, over the past two decades, the dependence
on foreign bank credit has shown few signs of decreasing (McGuire and Tarashev,
2008). Therefore, with only limited domestic sources of financing and generally less
stable macroeconomic environments than in developed economies, foreign syndicated
7While the extent to which foreign banks extend local credit in foreign currency — such as US
dollars, other reserve currencies, or the currency of their home country — is not directly reported by
the BIS, there has been a tendency for emerging market bonds to be issued increasingly in domestic
currency. For this shift away from the “original sin” hypothesis (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999),
according to which emerging markets can typically only borrow in foreign currency, and towards
local currency bond markets, see Committee on the Global Financial System (2007) and Burger,
Warnock, and Cacdac Warnock (2012).
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loans and the stability with which they are extended should be of major policy
concern.
3.3 Syndicated lending to emerging markets
3.3.1 Dataset and sample selection
This chapter uses the Dealogic Loan Analytics database, which provides detailed
information on deals signed in the global syndicated loan market. Most importantly,
it includes information on the key terms of each deal, such as loan volume, maturity,
interest rate, and currency of denomination.8
The names and countries of incorporation of the banks involved in a deal are also
given, as are the names and countries of incorporation of their parent banks. This
information is particularly relevant considering that some large, international banks
maintain branches and subsidiaries in emerging markets through which they extend
syndicated loans. Because foreign parent banks are likely to have a say in the actions
of their local affiliates, it is important to acknowledge these loans as different from
those made by other domestic banks. Consequently, I conduct the analysis at the
parent-bank level whilst accounting for a possible local-affiliate dimension.9
The information is similarly granular for borrowers, with full names and country
details provided for the firm itself and its parent company, which may be foreign. I
also account for that dimension in my analysis. In addition, Loan Analytics reports
the firm’s sector and industry classification.
I obtain information on all loans in the database between the beginning of coverage
in January 1980 and December 2012 before performing a number of data-cleaning
8If a deal consists of more than one tranche, these items are further broken down at the tranche
level. However, given that tranches are signed jointly as part of one deal, the analysis is at the deal
level, aggregating information from the different tranches where necessary.
9Note that I will therefore use the terms bank and parent bank interchangeably.
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exercises. First, I drop all bilateral deals in which a firm borrows from a single bank
because those correspond to traditional relationship loans rather than to the hybrid
nature of syndicated loan contracts as described in 3.2.1. For convenience, I also
drop a minor number of deals in which multiple borrowers are involved. Second, all
loans with incomplete information on the date of signing, the volume of the loan,
or on banks and borrowers as well as their respective parent companies are also
dropped. Third, I focus on newly signed or refinanced deals as opposed to those that
have been announced, amended, or which are merely expected to be signed. Fourth,
I drop loans to banks or other financial institutions and special purpose vehicles,
central governments, or supranational institutions in order to focus specifically on
credit to the real sector.
Finally, to account for mergers and acquisitions between banks and name changes,
I match the Loan Analytics data with Bankers’ Almanac records, including fuzzy
merges and manual checks, and consolidate affected banks into a single entity starting
from the date provided by Bankers’ Almanac.
3.3.2 Lending patterns
The data selection process yields a full sample of 9,038 syndicated loans in 124
emerging and developing countries with a total value of almost $2 trn. As Table 3.1
shows, syndication activity is rather unevenly distributed across markets. The top
10 countries by number of deals account for roughly 60 per cent of both the number
of deals in the sample (5,608 out of 9,038) and the total loan volume in end-of-2012
US dollars ($1,161.1 bn out of $1,997.2 bn).
The table also reports the composition of the average syndicate between domestic
and foreign banks for each country and for the full sample. For each deal, I calculate
the share of parent banks on the syndicate represented by foreign and domestic
institutions in terms of simple participation. That is, if there are 10 different parent
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Table 3.1: Major syndicated loan markets
Country Number of deals Loan volume ($ bn)
Syndicate composition
Domestic Foreign
China 960 155.0 18.6% 81.4%
Indonesia 723 92.9 16.2% 83.8%
Brazil 658 171.5 8.4% 91.6%
India 612 157.6 33.4% 66.6%
Thailand 600 80.1 10.4% 89.6%
Malaysia 511 83.5 41.8% 58.2%
Mexico 500 173.9 3.6% 96.4%
Russia 432 135.7 8.3% 91.7%
Philippines 307 47.5 24.2% 75.8%
Argentina 305 63.4 6.5% 93.5%
Full sample 9,038 1,997.2 14.4% 85.6%
Notes — This table shows the 10 most important emerging syndicated loan markets from the full sample
in terms of the total number of deals, including the total volume of deals in end-of-2012 US$ bn. Syndicate
composition is obtained by calculating the share of parent banks on the syndicate represented by foreign
(domestic) institutions at the deal level, and then averaging over all deals in the given country.
banks on a syndicate, eight of which are from a country foreign to the emerging
market in question, the foreign and domestic shares for the deal obtain as 80 and
20 per cent, respectively. Note that shares are based on the extensive margin, ie
mere participation, rather than the intensive margin, ie loan volumes, because of
data limitations on the loan volumes underwritten by individual banks.10 I average
these shares over all deals in a given country as well as over all deals in the sample
to arrive at the figures reported in Table 3.1.
It is worth noting that, despite some heterogeneity, the top 10 markets do not differ
much from the full sample in terms of syndicate composition. Foreign institutions
account for roughly 86 per cent of all participants on a typical syndicate in the full
sample, and figures are not systematically lower for the top 10 countries. With the
exceptions of India and Malaysia, at least three quarters of the average syndicate are
10The availability of individual underwriting amounts is quite low in Dealogic Loan Analytics
in general, with such information being given for only about a quarter of all loans (De Haas and
Van Horen, 2013), and for emerging markets in particular.
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represented by foreign parent banks. The Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina) and Russia stand out in particular with more than 90 per cent foreign
banks on a syndicate. Overall, these numbers emphasise the major role played by
foreign banks.
While some of the banks that are foreign to a certain emerging market are themselves
incorporated in an emerging or developing country — imagine a Brazilian parent
bank participating in a syndicated loan deal in Argentina —, the syndicated loan
market is dominated by banks from developed countries. This is also borne out
by Table 3.2, which lists the 20 most active banks in the emerging syndicated loan
market as measured by the total number of deals that they participated in.
These banks are from a set of only eight developed countries. With the exception of
BBVA, all banks participated in a syndicated loan deal at least once in 50 different
countries or even more. BNP Paribas, the most active bank, even did so in 91
different countries and was involved in a total of 2,281 deals, which amounts to a
quarter of the full sample. The other banks stand out as being highly active, too, in
that all but five of them took part in over 1,100 deals. Moreover, if one ranks markets
for each of the 20 banks according to the number of deals, the set unsurprisingly
reflects quite well the top 10 countries from Table 3.1, with minor differences in the
rank ordering between banks. In other words, all banks tend to sign most of their
loans in China, Indonesia, Brazil, or the other major syndicated loan markets.
To gain a better understanding of differences in lending patterns across banks, it is
therefore more instructive to examine which destinations a bank overweights relative
to other banks. The most overweighted countries for each bank, labelled focus
markets, are reported in the last three columns of Table 3.2. They obtain as follows.
I focus on the subsample of 21 countries in which all 20 lenders were active at least
once and compute the share of deals in this subsample accounted for by each market.
Then, I calculate for each bank individually the share of deals accounted for by each
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of the 21 countries and form the ratio of those bank-specific country shares to the
country shares from before. This ratio can be interpreted as measuring the degree
to which a bank overweights a given country relative to the other banks.
Table 3.2 shows each bank’s focus markets as those three destinations with the
highest overweighting ratios. It reveals that links between the bank’s home and the
destination country are important determinants of whether a bank focuses more
on one market than on others. French banks, for instance, are relatively active in
Morocco and Egypt, both of which were to different extents within France’s sphere
of influence at some point and, in the case of Morocco, share a widely used working
language. On a similar note, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina are focus markets for
BBVA from Spain. Geographical proximity also tends to increase a bank’s focus on
a country, as indicated by US banks’ preference for Mexico, for example, or Hungary
and Russia featuring prominently in German, Italian, and Dutch banks’ portfolios.
3.3.3 Sudden stops and the behaviour of foreign banks
As the discussion in 3.2.2 has highlighted, the supply of syndicated loans and its
stability should be of vital interest to policy makers because it accounts for a major
portion of cross-border flows to emerging markets. In the past, a number of them
have been subject to “sudden stops”, meaning abrupt slowdowns of private capital
inflows that tend to be followed by declines in output, in credit to the private sector,
and the value of the domestic currency in foreign exchange markets (Calvo, 1998).
Given the dominant role of foreign banks in funding syndicated loans, it is worth
examining whether there are some foreign banks that are more likely than others
to continue to extend credit to affected countries. Before being able to perform
such an analysis, a sensible dividing line has to be drawn first between at least two
groups of banks. In doing so, I draw inspiration from De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2006) who investigate the stability of traditional bank credit granted locally by
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subsidiaries of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors find that
whereas domestic banks contracted their credit base during crisis periods, it was
in particular greenfield foreign banks that did not. While the mechanisms behind
the latter finding are unobservable, setting up a greenfield subsidiary as opposed to
acquiring a local bank may signal that the bank is willing to bear a larger amount
of risk in the short and medium term, and/or that it expects this to be outweighed
in the long term. Alternatively, it may simply be taking a more benign look at the
country’s risk to begin with.
There is arguably a range of other possible explanations, but a foreign bank’s
assessment of country risk and potential is likely to feature in its decision whether
to participate in a syndicated loan deal. This is conceivably even more relevant with
regard to the first ever deals through which an emerging market and its companies
borrow in international markets since information asymmetries should be relatively
high at that time. Hence, a foreign bank’s decision to be a participant or not in the
first ever deals of a country shares some similarities with the motives for choosing
to be a greenfield or takeover entrant. Whereas the costs involved are certainly not
comparable between the syndicated loan and traditional banking businesses, the
signal contained in choosing to participate in an early deal might well be.
Within the group of foreign banks, I therefore distinguish between “early participants”
that were involved in the first syndicated loan deals ever signed in a respective country
and “late participants” that were involved in a deal with a borrower from that country
at some point, but not as part of the first few deals. I then examine syndicated loan
issuance in and around times of stress. The results of this examination suggest that
there actually are differences in the behaviour of these two groups of foreign banks.
This is shown in Figure 3.2, which plots changes in syndicate participation observed
around 30 sudden stop episodes in emerging markets for the two groups of banks:
early participants (“Foreign Early”) and late participants (“Foreign Late”). A foreign
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bank’s status as either an early or a late participant is based on whether it has taken
part in the first five deals in a given country. Sudden stops are taken from Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mej́ıa (2008).
The changes depicted in the figure obtain as follows. First, I calculate for each deal
the percentage share of parent banks on the syndicate accounted for by each group.
Consider the following simple example. If 10 different parent banks participated in a
deal in Poland in 1999, and three of those belong to the group of early participants
that signed up for one of the first five loan deals recorded for Poland, early participants’
share on the 1999 deal would be 30 per cent. Shares for late participants are computed
accordingly. Second, I consider all deals in the affected countries around and during
the sudden stop incidents, sorting them by the year relative to the sudden stop
in which they were signed, with all deals observed during the sudden stop itself
being assigned to period zero.11 Third, I calculate the mean of the two groups’
participation shares across all deals for each relative year. Suppose there were only
two sudden stops, one in Poland between March 1999 and May 2000 and one in
Mexico between March 1994 and November 1995. Shares would be averaged over
Polish March 1998 to February 1999 and Mexican March 1993 to February 1994
deals for relative year −1, over Polish June 2000 to May 2001 and Mexican December
1995 to November 1996 deals for relative year +1, and so on. Figure 3.2 then shows
the year-on-year changes in the average shares so obtained.12
The share of early participants changes very little before and during the sudden stop
period, but increases noticeably thereafter. In contrast, the syndicate participation
of late-participant foreign banks increases in the years before the sudden stop, only to
11This seems appropriate for purposes of comparison as the average length of sudden stops listed
in Calvo et al. (2008) is almost exactly one year.
12The figure only considers non-overlapping sudden stops to ensure that a year does not count
as both a post and a pre-crisis year. For example, Indonesia had sudden stops in short succession
from December 1997 through November 1998 and from December 1999 through November 2000.
In that particular case, it would not be clear whether to treat December 1998 through November
1999 as relative year −1 or +1. Both sudden stops are thus not included.
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Figure 3.2: Changes in syndicate participation around sudden stops
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Notes — This figure shows the changes in syndicate participation for two groups of banks (Foreign Early,
Foreign Late) based on 835 deals around 30 non-overlapping sudden-stop episodes in 30 emerging and
developing economies from Calvo et al. (2008). “Foreign Early” refers to foreign parent banks that par-
ticipated in the first five syndicated loan deals in the respective country, “Foreign Late” refers to foreign
parent banks that did not. The values in the figure obtain by computing the participation shares for each
of the two groups at the deal level, forming the mean over all deals across countries for the years relative
to sudden stops in year 0, before calculating the year-to-year changes of the means.
drop during the sudden stop and particularly in the year after. Hence, the dynamics
of late participant shares look more like a “hot money” story that is often attributed
to capital flows to emerging markets in general (see, eg, Chari and Kehoe, 1997),
while those of early participant shares do not. This is not to say that the number and
volume of syndicated loans that early participants are involved in during a sudden
stop do not decrease. However, on those deals that are signed, early participants are
relatively more active than before the crisis.
With regard to how banks are classified as being either early or late participants,
one might ask two questions: first, whether the first deals recorded in the data are
a reasonable guide to actual first deals, which relates to database coverage; and
second, whether the number of first deals being considered is appropriate. On the
first issue, recorded first deals seem to reflect actual deal signings quite accurately as
depicted in Figure 3.3, which reports the number of emerging markets in the sample
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Figure 3.3: Emerging markets with first syndicated loan, by year
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Note — This figure shows the number of emerging markets for which the first syndicated loan deal is
recorded in a given year in the sample.
for which the first ever loan deal is recorded in a given year. Noting that emerging
syndicated loan markets only developed in the 1970s as primarily a sovereign business
(Gadanecz, 2004), it appears plausible for first deals involving the real sector and
non-central government public entities in this sample to occur in 1980. Moreover,
11 of those countries that first show up in 1980 are from Latin America, which was
“introduced” to syndicated loans by US banks rather early. The first deals in Central
and Eastern Europe, in contrast, tend to be recorded some years later (eg, Poland
in 1987, the Czech Republic and Romania in 1990, Estonia in 1993) as one might
expect given the liberalisations that took place around the fall of the Iron Curtain.
As to the second issue, the number of deals on which early or late-participant status
is based has to be chosen carefully. On the one hand, just focusing on the very first
deal would appear too restrictive as only few banks may be needed to satisfy the
financing needs of the firm in question. In other words, a bank’s non-participation
in the very first deal should probably not be taken as evidence of, for example, its
unwillingness to take on the specific country risk. On the other hand, discriminating
on the basis of too many deals would make the partition equally unselective. The
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appropriateness of doing so for a given number of deals must be evaluated against
the total number of deals in a country over the sample period and the frequency with
which signings take place. While early participation is based on the first five deals
throughout the chapter, I will dwell more on this point and address the robustness
of my results to changes in the measure’s definition (see 3.4.3).
3.4 Empirical strategy and results
The previous section suggests differences in the behaviour of foreign banks in emerging
syndicated loan markets around sudden stops. However, despite the fact that the
latter are of major concern to policy makers in those countries, the patterns presented
so far still relate to only a relatively limited number of episodes in which conditions
were extremely adverse, and they are also merely descriptive in nature.
The goal in this section is to investigate more thoroughly whether the above obser-
vations are of more general relevance. In other words, are early-participant foreign
banks likely to “stick with” an emerging market, and do they tend to be a more
stable source of funding in “bad times” than other foreign banks?
As a first step, I follow up on the previous section by analysing the participation
shares of the two groups over the business cycle in a regression framework. This
allows for both deal and country heterogeneity and paints a nuanced picture of
foreign banks. In a second step, I model the individual decision of a foreign bank
whether to join the syndicate in a given deal and economic climate. In doing so, I
account for relationships at the micro level as well as cross-country linkages.
3.4.1 Aggregate analysis
To gain a first understanding of whether the behaviour of foreign banks around sudden
stops holds more generally, I look at how early and late participants respond to
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economic conditions, ie the business cycle. I do so following Qian and Strahan (2007),
who explain the participation shares of different groups of banks by simple OLS
regressions.13 The regression equation for the groups of early and late participants,
respectively, is given by:
Shared,i,c,t = α + β ·∆GDPc,t + Controlsd,c,t · γ + µc + ψi + ηt + εd,i,c,t .
Here, Shared,i,c,t is the participation share (in per cent) of the given group of banks
on loan deal d in industry i in country c signed in year t. Because a foreign bank’s
status as being an early or late participant is based on the first five deals recorded
in a country, those deals are not themselves considered in the estimation.
I account for borrower-country fixed effects µc and year-fixed effects ηt. The former
capture time-invariant institutional factors, which have been found to be important
determinants of foreign bank participation in emerging syndicated loan markets (eg,
Esty, 2004; Qian and Strahan, 2007).14 The latter control for global trends in foreign
bank activity in emerging markets, for example because emerging markets are often
regarded as a single asset class. Industry-fixed effects ψi are also included.
The key variable in the regression is ∆GDPc,t, the year-on-year change (in per cent)
in real GDP in the borrower country. By proxying the business cycle, it is meant to
capture economic conditions in a country at the time a syndicated loan deal is signed.
Because ∆GDP varies at the country-year level and there can be a substantial
number of deals signed in a given country and year, I cluster standard errors at that
level.
13In Qian and Strahan (2007), the groups examined are government-owned and domestic banks.
Because the authors use a sample starting in 1994 and also consider developed markets in their
analysis, they are able to include a sufficient number of deals for which participation shares can be
calculated on the basis of loan volume rather than binary participation decisions, as I do.
14I cannot directly control for such variables because they are either time-invariant themselves,
like legal origin, and therefore perfectly collinear with µc, or virtually collinear due to minimal
within variation. Creditor rights in the standard Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) database,
for example, remain constant for 106 out of 129 countries over a period of up to 25 years.
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This also explains why I estimate the model by pooled OLS as opposed to a panel
setup. The latter would demand some aggregating of information from those multiple
deals for a country-year pair before estimation. However, this is undesirable because
it would not exploit the richness of the deal data. Pooled OLS allows me to control
for variation at the deal level whilst imposing the necessary structure on the data via
the inclusion of country and year dummies, and by the clustering of standard errors.
Controls is a vector of time-varying country-level variables and deal-level controls.
At the country level, it includes the domestic banking system’s claims on the real
sector relative to the size of the economy, which proxies for financial development
and differences across countries in their reliance on foreign sources of funding, as well
as (log) GDP per capita to measure economic development (see Qian and Strahan,
2007). The latter also makes business cycles comparable across countries, which
matters in terms of the interpretation of ∆GDP . To see this, consider two countries,
both posting the same real GDP growth rate, but with the first country being
significantly more developed than the second. Since more developed countries tend
to have lower potential growth rates, country number one is likely to find itself in a
relatively more favourable position over the business cycle than country number two.
Hence, including GDP per capita helps towards the interpretation of the coefficient
on ∆GDP as reflecting the response of early and late participants’ shares in a given
country over time, rather than differences in growth rates across countries. I also
control for sudden stops and systemic banking crises as defined by Calvo et al. (2008)
and Laeven and Valencia (2012), respectively, to separate general business cycle
patterns from extremely adverse incidents.
At the deal level, I account for the major dimensions of the loan agreement — value,
maturity, spread, currency, and borrower sector. The deal value, measured in (logs
of) US$ mn, is the total volume of the deal supplied by all foreign and domestic
banks on the syndicate. The deal maturity, in years, is the maturity of the deal,
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obtained as a volume-weighted average of the maturities of the different tranches,
where necessary. The deal spread is the spread, in basis points, of the (average) loan
interest rate over the agreed reference rate, such as LIBOR. I also include whether a
deal has been signed in a major reserve currency and whether the borrower is from
the public or the private sector.
Definitions and data sources of all variables are provided in Table C.2 in the Appendix.
Note that through the inclusion of a wide range of control variables, the final
estimation sample covers a total of 5,593 deals in 68 emerging and developing
countries.15 For purposes of comparison, all results presented will henceforth refer to
this sample, including the micro-level analysis that follows in 3.4.2.
Before moving on to the discussion of the estimation results, I check whether ∆GDP
primarily reflects the macroeconomic situation of a country rather than a different
selection of borrowers. It is important to bear in mind that despite possible differences
between early and late participants, syndication activity is generally lower in “bad
times” than in “good times”, and that this is true for both the normal business cycle
and around sudden stop episodes. Therefore, in bad years only the very best firms in
a country might be able to obtain credit, whereas the threshold for banks to provide
funding in good years may be more generous. While the deal-level controls described
above are included to account for that, I perform a simple exercise to see whether
the within-country distribution of the deal variables changes with the business cycle.
In a country-year panel, I run fixed-effects regressions of the percentiles of the
continuous variables (deal value, deal maturity, deal spread) and the mean of the
reserve-currency dummy on ∆GDP . If those percentiles were significantly related
to changes in real GDP growth across the board, one might be concerned about
borrower selection interfering with the interpretation of ∆GDP as a “clean” proxy
15See Table C.1 in the Appendix for the full list of borrower countries in the estimation sample
and the number of deals accounted for by each of them.
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for economic conditions. However, as shown in Table C.3 in the Appendix, it is
reassuring that the coefficients are generally far from conventional significance levels.
Table 3.3 reports the results from the participation share regressions. They lend
first support to the idea that early-participant foreign banks may represent a more
stable source of funding in loan syndicates under unfavourable economic conditions.
Although the shares of both groups of foreign banks are negatively related to ∆GDP ,
the coefficient for early participants is significant at five per cent, whereas that for
late participants is insignificant at any conventional level (p-value of 38 per cent).
This is indicative of anti-cyclical behaviour on the part of early participants. At
the same time, it has to be acknowledged that the evidence should be taken as
preliminary since there are some factors that the shares analysis cannot incorporate.
I will shortly elaborate on and address these issues (see 3.4.2).
That notwithstanding, many findings on the control variables also turn out to be
interesting in their own right. For example, contrary to early participants, the other
foreign banks appear to be more hesitant to get involved in syndicated loan deals
that carry longer maturities. To the extent that this observation is not driven by
differences in composition between the two groups — for example, if early participants
were drawn from a pool of less risk-averse banks that might be more willing to extend
longer loans more generally —, being an early participant in a country may come
with learning effects and a (downward) re-appraisal of risk. Therefore, those banks
might sign up for loans of longer maturity in later deals.
On a similar note, while both groups of foreign banks are unsurprisingly more active
suppliers of funds on deals that are agreed upon in a major reserve currency, early and
late participants also seem to differ with regard to their appetite for exchange rate risk.
The coefficient on the corresponding dummy variable is approximately three times
as high for late participants, showing the latter to be much more concerned about
currency risk as well. Moreover, the results also point to cross-country differences in
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Table 3.3: Participation share regressions
Early participants Late participants
∆GDP -0.2419** -0.1070
(0.1212) (0.1217)
Deal value 0.3949 0.0969
(0.3357) (0.4625)
Deal maturity 0.1019 -0.5059***
(0.1132) (0.1203)
Deal spread -0.0103*** -0.0076***
(0.0030) (0.0028)
Deal in reserve currency 6.3330*** 19.0188***
(1.7598) (1.7851)
Private-sector borrower -2.3057 1.3134
(2.1846) (2.5703)
GDP per capita -5.9667** 6.9074***
(2.3271) (2.4655)
Domestic credit -0.0289 -0.0386
(0.0265) (0.0280)
Sudden stop -1.0629 1.9982
(1.6776) (1.5877)
Systemic banking crisis -1.9196 1.1593
(1.2295) (1.3272)
N 5,593 5,593
R2 0.2743 0.3026
Notes — This table shows regressions explaining the participation shares (in per cent) of early and late-
participant foreign parent banks in syndicated loan markets. Estimation is based on a total of 5,593 deals
in 68 emerging and developing countries. For variable definitions, see Table C.2 in the Appendix. All
specifications include a constant as well as borrower-country, industry, and year dummies. Standard errors
clustered at the country-year level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10
per cent levels, respectively.
the importance of distinguishing between the two groups since early participants’
shares tend to be higher in less developed countries, as measured by per-capita
GDP, whereas the opposite holds true for late participants’ shares. If one subscribes
to the idea that (perceived) country risk and frictions are higher in less developed
economies, this observation rounds off the picture that early participation matters
when it comes to different types of risk a bank faces in signing up for a syndicated
loan deal.
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3.4.2 Micro-level analysis
There remain a number of important factors that have not yet been considered.
Four caveats are worth emphasising in particular. First, the participation shares
of each group of banks do not only depend on the decisions made by parent banks
belonging to that group, but also on the decisions made by other banks. The relative
participation of early-participant foreign banks, for instance, is to some extent a
residual of the decision of late-participant banks — and domestic banks, for that
matter — to join or not join a syndicate. As will be described in more detail below,
I therefore model the binary choice of individual banks whether to participate in a
given syndicate loan or not.
Second, the aggregate analysis has taken as given whether a foreign bank is an early
or a late participant. However, a bank’s early-participant status is unlikely to be
random. It is quite conceivable that links between the parent bank and the emerging
market in question, or between the foreign parent bank’s country of incorporation
and that of the borrower, affect the decision (see Table 3.2). Strong links to the
borrower country, for example, might not only increase the probability of a parent
bank’s being an early participant, but also result in a more stable supply of credit
to that country more generally. Without accounting for such linkages, through the
prism of early-participant status one may simply be looking at a gravity story.
Third, it may be misleading to conclude that being an early participant in a given
country makes banks more willing to keep providing funds in syndicated loan deals
to that country even under adverse economic conditions as long as bank-borrower
relationships at the micro level are ignored. Suppose that, in each country, syndicated
loans went to only a small number of borrowers, and that banks repeatedly interacted
with those borrowers. In that case, the observation of bank-country ties developing
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through early participation could mask a standard relationship-lending story at the
micro level.
Fourth, some international banks are — and have long been — considerably more
important players in the syndicated loan market than others (see Table 3.2). There-
fore, as they have been involved in a substantially larger number of countries in
general, one would also think them more likely to be an early participant in any
given country. Detecting path dependence in syndicated lending to countries might
therefore be driven by such bank heterogeneity, as might more muted responses to un-
favourable economic conditions, perhaps because large, globally oriented banks look
more towards their overall international loan portfolio than to individual countries.
In the following, I address these caveats and incorporate them into the analysis.
More specifically, I model the binary choice of individual foreign banks in emerging
and developing economies whether or not to participate in a given syndicated loan
deal as
Pr(Particb,d,i,c,t = 1) = α + β · Earlyb,c + γ ·∆GDPc,t + δ · Earlyb,c ×∆GDPc,t
+ Controlsb,d,c,t · θ + µc + ψi + ηt + λb + εb,d,i,c,t ,
where Particb,d,i,c,t is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if parent bank
b participates in syndicated loan deal d in industry i in country c in year t, and zero
otherwise.
This setup requires that the sample be inflated in the sense that foreign parent banks
are also matched with deals in which they did not actually participate. Inflation is
conducted at the country level, matching a bank with all deals in a given country
if it has participated in at least one deal in that country, and assigning a value of
zero or one for Partic accordingly. I do so since the key issue lies in telling apart
the behaviour of banks in a country depending on early or late-participant status.
Therefore, adding banks that never signed up for deals in a given country does not
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come with any gains in terms of identification. Also, since those banks cannot be
early participants by definition, including them would create a bias towards finding
a positive level effect β. Overall, inflating the data results in Partic being zero for
about 97 per cent of the observations.
I estimate the participation probability Pr(Partic = 1) using a linear probability
model, which seems the most appropriate choice in this context. Note that the
central interest is in the marginal effects β and δ that capture, respectively, level
differences in early and late participants’ probabilities of taking part in syndicated
loan deals in a country and differences in responsiveness to local economic conditions.
A linear probability model, while not strong at predicting individual probabilities,
provides reasonable estimates of marginal effects and the significance of variables
without additional distributional assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Consider
further that the key variable Early, a bank’s early or late-participant status, can
only take on two possible values. Hence, there is little apparent benefit in running a
probit or logit model that evaluates the variable at a hypothetical sample mean of
between zero and one that it can never take on. Moreover, the substantial number of
dummy variables may generate problems when performing the maximum-likelihood
estimation that would be required to do so (Popov and Van Horen, 2013). Finally,
the coefficient on the interaction term Early ×∆GDP is readily interpretable in a
linear as opposed to a non-linear model (see Ai and Norton, 2003).
In all regressions, bank-fixed effects λb account for time-invariant differences between
foreign parent banks to alleviate concerns about bank heterogeneity (caveat four
from above). This is in addition to country-fixed effects µc, year-fixed effects ηt,
and industry-fixed effects ψi already included in the aggregate analysis. I continue
to cluster standard errors at the country-year level. In the absence of parent bank
balance sheet or profit-and-loss data, I also cluster at the bank-year level in order to
capture shocks to the parent bank’s financial health in period t, which is likely to
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influence the participation probabilities in deals across countries. Two-way clustering
is implemented following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011). Other clustering
schemes are also explored in the robustness checks (see 3.4.3).
Controls contains all variables from the aggregate analysis. In addition, there are
two sets of variables to account for linkages at the country level and micro-level
relationships, respectively, addressing caveats two and three from above. I include
the distance between the parent bank’s country of incorporation and the borrower
country, whether the former used to be a coloniser of the latter, and whether the
two countries share a common language. This is to net out a common effect of
bilateral linkages on the level of Pr(Partic = 1) on the one hand, and the potentially
higher stability with which credit is granted to more closely affiliated emerging
markets on the other. These controls are widely used in the gravity literature and
have been shown to correlate with other bilateral measures such as trade or FDI as
well as cross-country financial holdings (see, eg, Portes and Rey, 2005; Aviat and
Coeurdacier, 2007; Eichengreen and Tong, 2007; Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard,
2010). Ideally, one would want to control directly for trade and/or FDI linkages in
those years in which banks’ statuses as early or late participants are determined.
However, data are only available more broadly from around the mid-1990s and thus
unlikely to be more indicative of the early-participation years in mostly the 1980s
than the variables used here. Therefore, their inclusion would merely reduce the
universe of emerging markets available for identification.
At the bank level, I control for a range of indicators to capture a bank’s participation
in at least one syndicated loan deal prior to the deal in question with the same
borrower, the same borrower parent, or any borrower in the country. The first two
of those variables are important to separate the pure relationship lending decision at
the micro level from whatever might make an early-participant foreign bank more
willing to extend credit to the emerging market in which the borrower is based.
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The logic that applies to the borrower itself also carries over to a prior relationship
with the borrower parent, which may provide a financial backstop for its affiliates.
Moreover, it is crucial to disentangle simple serial correlation in a bank’s syndicate
lending from the effect of its early-participant status by including a variable that
measures the mere occurrence of prior lending. I also add an analogous variable on
whether there has previously been syndicated lending via a bank’s local affiliate to
capture possible spillovers from standard banking business in the country in terms
of lending experience gained or a demonstrated commitment to the market. Finally,
GDP growth in the parent bank’s country of incorporation is included as a “push”
factor, mirroring the “pull” factor of GDP growth in the borrower country (see
De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). Definitions and data sources of all variables are
provided in Table C.2 in the Appendix.
The results of the linear probability model regressions are reported in Table 3.4,
where all coefficients have been scaled up by the factor 100. Column (1) picks up from
the aggregate analysis, using the same set of macro and deal-level controls. Columns
(2) and (3) add, respectively, different kinds of prior lending by the foreign parent
bank and gravity variables, including GDP growth in the parent bank’s country of
incorporation. In column (4), the levels of these variables are considered jointly,
before their interactions with the business cycle are investigated in column (5).
The first thing to note is that Early is highly significant across all specifications. This
suggests that foreign parent banks belonging to the group of early participants in a
country are more likely to sign up for further syndicated loan deals in that country
as compared to the other foreign banks. In the most conservative specification, the
probability is roughly 0.9 percentage points higher for early than for late participants.
Considering that the average participation probability in the sample is about 3.2
per cent, this is also economically significant. Hence, there is evidence that early
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participation introduces a major element of path dependence into syndicated lending
to emerging markets.
Moreover, the gap in participation probabilities between early and late participants
tends to widen with falling real GDP growth. In other words, early participants
are less responsive than late participants to changes in economic conditions. Yet,
for the full set of foreign parent banks considered in Table 3.4, this result is only
statistically significant for the more parsimonious models (1) through (4), but not
for the most conservative specification in column (5). Taken literally, a change in a
country’s real GDP growth by one sample standard deviation (circa 4.3 percentage
points) is accompanied by a change in participation probability that is roughly 0.1
percentage points smaller for early participants. As this is also economically small,
the micro-level analysis can only substantiate to a limited amount the behavioural
patterns documented around sudden stops and the findings of the aggregate analysis.
I will shortly demonstrate, however, that this is driven by Japanese parent banks,
which the empirical literature has shown to be behaving distinctly, and that the
evidence for non-Japanese banks is strongly in favour of early participants reacting
less to changes in economic conditions.
It is also instructive to take a closer look at the newly added control variables and
how they affect the magnitude of the main coefficients of interest. For example,
there is an interesting and highly plausible cascade of the relative importance of
country and borrower-level relationships. The marginal effect on the probability of
participating in a syndicated loan deal is highest if a bank has already been involved
in a prior deal with the same borrower (9.4 percentage points [pps] in column (5)).
This is followed by whether it has extended a syndicated loan to a borrower from
the country via a local affiliate (7.0 pps) and whether it has previously lent to the
borrower’s parent (5.8 pps), although this order is reversed in specifications (2) and
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(4). However, it is striking that the coefficient on prior local lending far exceeds that
of prior lending per se, which is quite small and even insignificant in specification
(5). It is also worth noting that prior lending in itself is a lot less important in
determining participation probability than whether a bank is an early participant or
not.
Similar to traditional bank loans, and unlike standard capital market instruments,
these findings speak in favour of syndicated loan deals containing important re-
lationship elements at both the country and borrower levels, too. In particular,
the discrepancy in participation probabilities between banks that previously lent
cross-border and those that did so locally is in line with a host of theoretical and
empirical contributions from the classic banking literature. They point to the limited
amount or outright lack of soft information and knowledge of the destination country
faced by pure cross-border lenders, at least as compared to lending through affiliates
that became part of a foreign banking group via acquisition (eg, Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez, 2004; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Claeys and Hainz, 2007; Van Tassel
and Vishwasrao, 2007; Lehner, 2009; De Haas, Ferreira, and Taci, 2010).16 The
results presented in Table 3.4 therefore suggest that learning effects by granting
loans locally, or perhaps simply a stronger commitment to the given country, “spill
over” to the syndicated business as well.
With regard to the magnitude of Early, column (2) shows that the impact of
controlling for other lending relationships is sizeable — the coefficient is almost
halved —, but that it continues to be statistically and economically significant.
Moreover, as expected, gravity variables account for part of a bank’s early-participant
status, yet reduce the coefficient on Early only slightly and much less so than the
set of relationship controls (compare specifications (1) and (3)). Distance, common
16However, Detragiache et al. (2008) note that local market knowledge and customer relationships
may even be lost when foreign banks enter by purchasing local banks if geographic and/or cultural
distance are large.
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language, and the parent bank’s home country having at some point colonised the
borrower country are all signed as anticipated and highly significant throughout.
GDP growth in the parent bank country is always highly positive and significant,
indicating that there are strong positive “push” factors at work in syndicated lending
to emerging and developing countries. However, this is again driven by Japanese
banks whose exclusion from the sample immediately renders the parent country
growth insignificant. This is in line with empirical literature that has investigated
“push” and “pull” factors in cross-border and affiliate bank lending. On the one
hand, evidence is mixed with some papers documenting positive “push” relationships,
others negative (see, eg, Moshirian, 2001; Jeanneau and Micu, 2002). On the other
hand, both Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Mart́ınez Peŕıa et al. (2002) identify a
positive effect of the health of the Japanese economy on Japanese banks’ international
lending. Peek and Rosengren (1997) show that drops in stock prices in the early
1990s precipitated a reduction in lending by the US branches of Japanese banks.
Mart́ınez Peŕıa et al. (2002) find negative “push” factors in the sense that foreign
banks overall increased their credit supply to Latin America when home country
conditions deteriorated, but that this was not the case for Japanese banks. The fact
that I make the same observation as part of my regression analysis further supports
the idea of also looking at a sample excluding Japanese banks and, crucially, how
this affects the key coefficients of interest.
Finally, column (5) reports the coefficients on interactions of prior bank-country
relationships and bilateral, gravity-type linkages at the country level with ∆GDP .
These are generally insignificant, but the interaction term of ∆GDP and prior local
lending is large and highly significant. It is signed negatively as expected, reinforcing
the notion that having a local presence in a country not only matters in terms of the
general willingness to grant syndicate loans, but also in terms of the responsiveness
to the business cycle.
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3.4.3 Robustness and subsample analysis
Changing the set of parent banks
It has already been stressed that, depending on the set of parent banks considered, the
results from the micro-level analysis may differ in terms of significance. In particular,
the inclusion or exclusion of Japanese parent banks, whose distinct behaviour has
also been singled out by other empirical papers, has a bearing on the magnitude and
significance of the interaction term ∆GDP × Early, ie differences in responsiveness
to the business cycle between early and late participants. As soon as Japanese banks
are dropped from the regression, the coefficient is highly significant and economically
large even in the most conservative specification. This is shown in Table 3.5, which
examines the results that obtain by running the most conservative specification (5)
from Table 3.4 for four different sets of parent banks. It focuses on the two key
coefficients of interest, with full results reported in Table C.4 in the Appendix.
Excluding Japanese banks, a drop in real GDP growth by one sample standard
deviation of roughly 4.3 percentage points is accompanied by a widening of the wedge
between early and late banks’ participation probabilities of almost 0.4 percentage
points (column “All ex JPN”). This is sizeable when compared to an average
participation probability in the now smaller sample of 3.4 per cent and points to
important differences in the two groups’ responsiveness to changes in economic
conditions. I also look at whether there are major differences in behaviour between
all foreign parent banks (“All”) and the group of banks incorporated in developed
countries (“Dev”), which still dominate the global syndicated loan market, but do not
find any. Again, however, dropping Japanese institutions from the set of developed
country banks (“Dev ex JPN”) yields a significant interaction term ∆GDP ×Early.
In the following, I will therefore refer to the results from further robustness checks for
the full set of parent banks (“All”) and excluding Japanese banks (“All ex JPN”).
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Table 3.5: Key coefficients for different sets of banks
Set of foreign parent banks
All All ex JPN Dev Dev ex JPN
Early 0.8862*** 1.0240*** 0.9319*** 1.1297***
∆GDP × Early -0.0327 -0.1050*** -0.0162 -0.1034***
Notes — This table shows the coefficients on the two key variables of interest, Early and ∆GDP ×Early,
in linear probability regressions explaining the participation in a syndicated loan deal for four different
sets of foreign parent banks and based on the most conservative specification as in Table 3.4, column (5).
“All” denotes the set of all foreign parent banks, including those that are themselves incorporated in an
emerging country but foreign from the point of view of the emerging market borrower in question. “Dev”
only refers to those parent banks that are incorporated in a developed country. For both cases, the table
also reports the corresponding sets when Japanese parent banks are excluded (“ex JPN”). ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Full results of the above regressions
are shown in Table C.4 in the Appendix.
Alternative clustering schemes
I have so far clustered standard errors at the country-year and bank-year levels. This
was to account for the fact that ∆GDP , which is a key ingredient in the analysis,
only varies at the country-year level and to capture shocks to the parent bank’s
financial health in a given year, which may affect its participation probability in
deals across countries.
The other key ingredient is the early-participant status dummy Early, which varies
only at the bank-country level. Moreover, important controls such as prior (local)
lending to a given emerging market will be zero until a bank signs its first (local)
deal in the country, and one thereafter. These can be thought of as treatment
variables that are highly serially correlated at the bank-country level. Not correcting
for this could lead to the underestimation of standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan, 2004). I therefore re-run the most conservative specification from
Table 3.4, column (5), using two-way clustered errors at (a) the country-bank and
bank-year levels, and (b) the country-bank and country-year levels. As shown in
Table C.5 in the Appendix, the results are unaffected by this.
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Alternative early-participation measures
Up to now, a bank’s status as either an early or a late participant has been based on
the first five deals. I have already pointed out that there exists a trade-off in choosing
this number (see 3.3.3). It would be too restrictive to focus on only the very first
deal because the loan amount is essentially fixed in negotiations between borrower
and lead arranger before the latter turns to potential participants, and because there
is a natural lower bound to individual underwriting amounts. For that reason — and
probably simple organisational ones —, the number of banks on a given syndicate
is bounded from above. Hence, not finding a bank on the very first syndicate in a
country reveals little about its desire or willingness to join and, in consequence, its
view of country risk. With a larger number of first deals considered, the dividing
line between early and late participants thus becomes more meaningful by increasing
the likelihood that a bank that is willing to join a syndicate will actually be able to
do so.
At the same time, including ever more deals in the measure also risks diluting it.
By extending the time span covered, it becomes harder to argue that banks signing
up for the later of those deals can still be considered early participants, and that
their decision to participate or not is made under the same veil of uncertainty as
in, say, the first five cases. This makes it harder to narrow down the measure’s
interpretation. Moreover, from a more technical point of view, it is also important to
consider the number of deals on which the definition of Early is based relative to the
total number of deals signed in a country. To see this, suppose the five-deals measure
is used and regressions include countries with just very few additional deals. For
instance, only one further deal was signed in Bolivia, Guinea, Latvia, and Lebanon
after the first five (see Table C.1 in the Appendix). The early-participation and
prior-participation dummies are thus identical for the sixth deal in those countries,
which hampers the ability of regression analysis to accurately distinguish between
124
3. Foreign Banks in Emerging Syndicated Loan Markets
mere repeated lending and the impact of early participation. If, in contrast, there are
many deals from the sixth one onwards, the prior participation dummy and Early
— and their interactions with ∆GDP — can be identified independently through
further distinct variation at the bank-country level.
I therefore re-estimate specification (5) from Table 3.4 with early participation based
on the first three and 10 deals for the entire estimation sample, as well as based on
the five-deals measure, but for countries with a total number of at least 30 and 50
deals only. The results for all banks and excluding Japanese banks, respectively, are
shown in Tables C.6 and C.7 in the Appendix.
For both sets of banks, any measure used, or subsample considered, early partici-
pants are significantly more likely to sign up for deals in a country. Differences in
participation probabilities between early and late participants also continue to in-
crease with deteriorating economic conditions, in particular for non-Japanese parent
banks, as evidenced by consistently negative and economically large coefficients on
∆GDP ×Early in all specifications. With the exception of the three-deals measure,
which is only significant at the 18 per cent level, the interaction terms are also highly
significant statistically.17
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter, I provide evidence that foreign parent banks that took part in the
first ever deals in an emerging or developing country are more likely to participate
in further deals, and that they are less responsive to changes in economic conditions
than other foreign banks. Importantly, these patterns possess explanatory power over
and above rival explanations such as relationship lending at the borrower level, simple
repeated cross-border and local lending at the country level, as well as gravity-style
17This is what one might expect given the lack of power with which one can discriminate between
banks and their willingness to be active in a country on the basis of only three deals.
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linkages between lender and borrower countries. These findings are interesting from
several points of view.
For one thing, the results are relevant for emerging markets regardless of the channel
through which they come about. Policy makers may, for instance, want to monitor
loan syndicates as to the composition between these two groups of foreign banks, given
the fact that the gap in participation probabilities tends to widen with deteriorating
economic conditions and given the changes in participation shares observed around
sudden stop episodes. A major concern of policy makers in that regard would have
to be whether early participants contribute to the stability of syndicated lending.
Because only signed deals are observed in equilibrium but credit demand from firms
is not, no direct evidence can be provided on this. However, one could argue that
early participants do constitute a source of stability if one thinks of the syndication
process in which the lead arranger turns to participants that signal their interest in
signing up for a deal. Unless the lead arranger changes the way it selects banks from
the pool of potential banks depending on the economic conditions, no systematic
differences in actual participation should be found. Considering that the results in
this chapter tell otherwise, it seems plausible that some deals would not have been
finalised, and thus observed, had it not been for early participants. Hence, while
broadening the creditor base may be a desirable policy goal for emerging markets,
the results in this chapter can be interpreted as pointing to the risk of doing so
indiscriminately and as contributing to a more nuanced picture.
Turning to potential channels behind differences in banks’ observed behaviour,
a combination of two factors is likely to be at work. On the one hand, early
participation can be viewed as revealing a bank’s assessment of country risk (and
return) that is at variance with that of other banks to begin with. Considering that
first deals are signed in a more insecure and informationally opaque environment,
the information conveyed by a bank’s choice to grant a loan could be considered
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particularly strong. This interpretation takes early participation to be primarily a
signal, or a good summary measure, of otherwise unobserved bank-specific attitudes
to different countries.
On the other hand, participation in the first ever deals may provide banks with
a particular kind of learning about the emerging market. Repeated lending more
generally helps to reduce information asymmetries and to acquire proprietary infor-
mation about borrowers (Boot, 2000), which can be re-used in assessing whether
to grant another loan (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2007). By building informational
advantages over other banks, experienced ones have to bear lower lending costs
and may therefore supply more loans on average and under worsening economic
conditions. This chapter’s findings are consistent with the potential to gain such
advantages extending not only beyond the borrower level, but also beyond prior
lending to other borrowers in the country. They suggest that involvement in early
deals might give participant banks an additional edge, perhaps because these very
first deals represent an opportunity to gain particularly profound knowledge of the
intricacies of lending to a country, such as the institutional and legal environment
(see De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). Possessing or not possessing that knowledge
could then carry over to different behaviour of foreign banks when it comes to signing
up for further deals.
The results are also interesting in view of the nature of syndicated loans as a hybrid
between standard bank loans and capital market instruments. They point to an
important relationship-lending element at the bank-country level, underscoring the
idea that participation in syndicated loan deals is distinctly different from the
purchase of, say, a standard corporate bond. The relationship side of syndicated
lending is commonly attributed primarily to lead arrangers, who organise the deal
before turning to further participant banks and who bear the brunt in terms of loan
volume underwritten as well as screening and monitoring duties.
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However, it need not be confined to lead arrangers, but may also be relevant
for the non-lead participants on a deal. At least there is no clear evidence from
tentative analysis that being an early participant only matters in terms of future
participation in case a bank has arranged an early loan syndicate (see Table C.8
in the Appendix, where adding controls for early lead arrangers does not alter the
conclusions). While based on admittedly fragmentary information — banks’ lead-
arranger statuses are only available occasionally for earlier deals —, this reinforces
the notion that syndicated loans constitute complex financial contracts that are still
not fully understood. The results in this chapter therefore also highlight the need
for future research to shed more light on the nature of syndicated lending more
generally.
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A.1 The methodology of benchmark portfolios
A.1.1 Mapping the credit allocation decision
We map the international credit allocation problem into a mean-variance choice
among national equity indices, which serve as representative assets for a typical
company located in a given country. The necessary link between a representative
company’s loan repayments and the development of its equity and asset values is
established by the Merton (1974) firm-value model and practitioners’ implementations
of it. The key points for the purpose of our analysis are described in the following.
The Merton (1974) model postulates a closed-form solution for the pricing of a firm’s
risky debt on the basis of Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing theory under the
following main simplifying assumptions:
• A single, homogeneous debt issue and equity as the residual claim constitute
the firm’s only liabilities.
• The debt liability is a promise to pay back the face value D to the creditor at
a fixed maturity date T .
• The firm can only default at maturity. If it does, the company is taken over by
the creditors.
• The firm cannot issue new claims, pay dividends, or engage in share repurchases
before maturity.
Hence, a firm will default if its total asset value VA falls short of the face value of
debt D at maturity T , in which case creditors collect the residual value VA < D.
Otherwise, it will repay the face value of debt in full. The payoff to holders of the
firm’s debt can be interpreted as the sum of payoffs from safe debt and a short put
130
A. Appendix to Chapter 1
option on the company’s asset value with strike price D. This is illustrated in Figure
A.1.
Figure A.1: Repayment profile of risky debt
Payoff
D
D Asset value at maturity
Whether or not the firm defaults and creditors are repaid in full therefore depends
on the asset value at maturity. According to Black and Scholes (1973), the market
value of the firm’s assets follows the stochastic process
dVA = µVAdt+ σAVAdz ,
where µ is the drift of the firm’s asset value, σA its volatility, and dz a standard
Brownian motion.
Due to only a firm’s equity being publicly traded, the market value of assets VA
and the parameters of the stochastic process have to be estimated on the basis of
stock market information, for which Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing theory
provides the link:
VE = VA Φ
 ln (VAD )+
(
r +
σ2A
2
)
T
σA
√
T
− e−rTDΦ
 ln (VAD )+
(
r − σ
2
A
2
)
T
σA
√
T
 .
Here, VE denotes the value of equity, and r is the risk-free rate. Industry models,
such as Moody’s KMV, arrive at the parameters of the asset value process through
complex iterative processes (see, eg, Crouhy et al., 2000; Crosbie and Bohn, 2003;
Kealhofer, 2003). It is more important for our analysis, however, that there is a
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monotonic relationship between equity volatility σE and asset volatility σA. Moreover,
with D fixed, there is also a positive association between the expected return on
equity µE and the expected return on assets µ. Therefore, our estimates µ̂E and σ̂E
contain valuable information on µ and σA as well and, consequently, the distribution
of VA at maturity.
Figure A.2: Asset value process and default
D
Default threshold
Possible asset value path
Asset value
T Time
distribution in T
Asset value
Asset volatility
Drift
0
Note — Adapted from Crosbie and Bohn (2003), using the notation introduced in this section.
Figure A.2 shows that this distribution determines the expected repayment via the
probability of whether default occurs in case of VA < D, and only a fraction of the
face value of debt D can be collected, or whether the full face value of debt D is
repaid in case of VA ≥ D. Crucially, the probability of default depends negatively
on the drift µ of the asset value process — as it results in a higher mean of the
distribution at maturity that is farther away from the default threshold —, and,
under plausible assumptions, negatively on the asset volatility σA. To see this, note
that the asset value stochastic process implies
lnV TA = lnV
0
A +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T + σA
√
Tε ,
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where V 0A and V
T
A are the asset values at times 0 and T , respectively. ε is the random
component of the firm’s asset return, which is assumed to follow a standard normal
distribution in Black and Scholes (1973). The probability of default therefore obtains
as
PD = Pr
[
lnV TA ≤ lnD
]
= Pr
[
lnV 0A +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T + σA
√
Tε ≤ lnD
]
= Pr
ε ≤ − ln V 0AD +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T
σA
√
T
 = Φ
− ln V 0AD +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T
σA
√
T
 .
Differentiation with respect to µ and σA yields
dPD
dµ
= −
√
T
σA︸︷︷︸
>0
φ
− ln V 0AD +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T
σA
√
T

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
and
dPD
dσA
=
1
σ2A
√
T︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
φ
− ln V 0AD +
(
µ− σ
2
A
2
)
T
σA
√
T

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
ln
V 0A
D
+
(
µ+
σ2A
2
)
T
]
.
Plausibly assuming that the firm is not already in default when the loan is granted,
V 0A ≥ D, implies ln
V 0A
D
≥ 0. Moreover, in the context of long-term portfolio opti-
misation — we estimate return properties over a period of nine years —, it is also
reasonable to assume that µ ≥ 0.1 We therefore have that dPD
dσA
≥ 0. In terms of
maximising expected loan repayments, banks should therefore prefer to invest in
countries with higher µ’s and lower σA’s.
However, as already argued in the main text, a country’s business cycle is more
aligned with that of some countries than with that of others. It can thus be beneficial
to exploit the asynchronicity of business cycles by granting loans even to countries
with a relatively risky individual lending environment, but where loans are more
1This is also borne out by our mean return estimates. Calculating a mean return as an input to
the optimisation procedure for each of the 35 · 5 = 175 country-year combinations, (mildly) negative
values are obtained in only six cases.
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likely to be repaid precisely when conditions are bad in other countries. In our
framework, this should be reflected in how strongly the asset value processes of
countries’ representative firms correlate, which we proxy by the estimates of bilateral
correlations ρ of returns on national equity indices.
A.1.2 Portfolio optimisation and resampling
With µ’s, σA’s, and ρ’s characterising the representative assets of countries in the
sample, the efficient frontier can be traced out (see Figure A.3). It indicates the
highest expected return for a given level of risk (ie, standard deviation of return)
or, conversely, the lowest risk for a given level of expected return. The lower the
correlations between the different representative assets’ returns, the higher the
potential benefits from international diversification will be, and the more the efficient
frontier will shift towards the upper left.
Given the risk-free rate r, only investments that yield µ-σ combinations along the
capital market line are optimal, which obtain as a mixture of the risky tangency
portfolio and the riskless asset. However, by the Tobin (1958) separation theorem,
the composition of the risky part of each bank’s portfolio is equal to that of the
tangency portfolio. Therefore, the latter helps us recover the optimal country weights
as the relative amounts invested in countries’ representative assets. For example, if
five per cent of the tangency portfolio are invested in the equity index for France,
the share for France before adjusting for credit demand (see 1.3) will also be five per
cent. Due to the imposition of short-selling constraints, all weights are non-negative.
We estimate the inputs µi, σiA, and ρ
i,j for all countries i, j = 1, ..., 35; i 6= j based on
a nine-year rolling window of monthly euro/deutschmark returns of national MSCI
Barra equity indices. The window length is chosen to ensure two things. First, we
are interested in rather long windows to give reliable estimates of returns — the
asset allocation literature often uses 120 months of data to this end —, and to
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Figure A.3: Mean-variance portfolio choice
Expected return
Standard deviation of return
Risk-free rate
Capital market line
Efficient frontier
Representative assets
Tangency portfolio
reflect country fundamentals through the business cycle rather than the impact of
short-term developments, such as stock market rallies. Second, starting in 2003, we
would like to consider a broad range of countries for reasons of identification. In
particular, several Eastern European countries have a major foreign bank presence
(see, eg, De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011) and are of
potentially strategic importance for German banks. We therefore decide to estimate
return moments over a nine-year window to be able to include those countries for
the 2003–2007 period as well.
As a further refinement, we resample the above mean-variance portfolios because
these can be severely impaired when point estimates are treated as if they were known
with certainty (Michaud, 1989), leading to unrealistically exclusive and/or unstable
portfolios. The resampling approach is essentially a bootstrapping technique, as
described in more detail in Jorion (1992), Michaud (1998), and Scherer (2002). The
main idea is to calculate a separate efficient frontier and optimal representative-
asset, ie tangency, portfolio for each draw, with the bootstrapped optimal portfolio
obtaining as the average of portfolios from those draws. This is illustrated in Figure
A.4.
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Figure A.4: Portfolio resampling
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In our case, we use a parametric method (see Scherer, 2002) and sample 1,000 times
from a multivariate normal distribution characterised by our initial estimates of µi,
σiA, and ρ
i,j to trace out a new efficient frontier for each draw. We then divide the
return scale into 100 equally spaced points between the return associated with the
minimum-variance portfolio of the unresampled efficient frontier and the maximum
return of the unresampled efficient frontier. Afterwards, we compute for each draw
the portfolio with the lowest standard deviation that generates the return value
associated with each of the 100 return points, before forming an average over the
composition of all 1,000 portfolios for each return point. Finally, the resampled
frontier obtains by evaluating the averaged portfolios with the original, unresampled
variance-covariance matrix. The resampled mean-variance portfolios weights indeed
turn out to be more balanced and much less volatile.
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A.2 Further information and results
Table A.1: List of countries
Name Development Region
Argentina Emerging and developing South America
Australia Advanced East Asia and Oceania
Austria Advanced Western Europe
Belgium Advanced Western Europe
Brazil Emerging and developing South America
Canada Advanced North America
Chile Emerging and developing South America
China Emerging and developing East Asia and Oceania
Colombia Emerging and developing South America
Czech Republic Advanced Eastern Europe
Denmark Advanced Western Europe
France Advanced Western Europe
Greece Advanced Western Europe
Hungary Emerging and developing Eastern Europe
India Emerging and developing South and Southeast Asia
Indonesia Emerging and developing South and Southeast Asia
Ireland Advanced Western Europe
Israel Advanced Middle East and Africa
Italy Advanced Western Europe
Japan Advanced East Asia and Oceania
Mexico Emerging and developing North America
Netherlands Advanced Western Europe
Norway Advanced Western Europe
Philippines Emerging and developing South and Southeast Asia
Poland Emerging and developing Eastern Europe
Russia Emerging and developing Eastern Europe
South Africa Emerging and developing Middle East and Africa
South Korea Advanced East Asia and Oceania
Spain Advanced Western Europe
Sweden Advanced Western Europe
Switzerland Advanced Western Europe
Thailand Emerging and developing South and Southeast Asia
Turkey Emerging and developing Middle East and Africa
United Kingdom Advanced Western Europe
United States Advanced North America
Notes — Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook. Region is self-defined.
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Table A.2: Return characteristics, by development (year-end 2007)
Monthly return Correlations
Mean Std dev Advanced Emerging
Advanced economies 0.8% 5.3% 0.55 0.39
Emerging and developed economies 1.7% 9.5% 0.39
Notes — This table characterises the monthly return moments of the 35 representative assets in the
sample by their individual means and standard deviations, and by correlations with the other assets. For
individual return characteristics, the reported figures represent median values of the constituent assets’
means and standard deviations of return for the given stage of economic development (see Table A.1). For
correlations, the table reports the median of pairwise return correlations among constituent assets. All
figures are based on nine years of monthly euro/deutschmark returns between January 1999 and December
2007. Section A.1 provides further details.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std dev Minimum Maximum
FDI 0.029 0.012 0.045 0.000 0.269
EURO 0.229 0 0.420 0 1
DIST 0.923 0.725 1.324 -1.751 2.807
CENTRE 0.086 0 0.280 0 1
INSTITUTIONS 66.004 65.300 8.810 50.600 82.600
CAPITAL 5.524 6 1.527 2 9
TRANSPARENCY 4.239 4 0.966 2 7
SUPERVISION 11.557 12 2.422 7 16
ENTRY 7.354 8 1.411 0 8
RESTRICT 2.302 2.250 0.598 1.000 3.500
GOVT 13.464 9.300 16.565 0.000 75.270
CREDIT 0.745 0.719 0.477 0.096 1.918
STMKTCAP 0.692 0.561 0.488 0.152 3.015
NIM 0.039 0.029 0.026 0.007 0.144
CONC 0.577 0.564 0.192 0.148 1.000
Notes — This table provides descriptive statistics of all variables used in the investigation. For definitions
and data sources, see Table A.3.
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Table B.1: Sovereign bond yield data sources and availability
Bloomberg (33 countries)
1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States (January), Switzerland (February)
1997 Portugal (February), Greece (July)
1998 Hong Kong (March), Singapore (June), India (November)
1999 Taiwan (April)
2000 Thailand (January), Czech Republic (April), South Korea (December)
2002 Slovakia (June), Romania (August)
2006 Israel (February)
2007 Slovenia (March)
2008 Iceland (April)
JP Morgan EMBI Global (41 countries)
1994 Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela (January), China (March), Brazil
(April), Bulgaria (July), Poland (October), South Africa (December)
1995 Ecuador (February)
1996 Turkey (June), Panama (July), Croatia (August), Malaysia (October)
1997 Colombia (February), Peru (March), Philippines, Russia (December)
1998 Lebanon (April)
1999 Hungary (January), Chile (May)
2000 Ukraine (May)
2001 Pakistan (January), Uruguay (May), Egypt (July), Dominican Republic
(November)
2002 El Salvador (April)
2004 Indonesia (May)
2005 Serbia (July), Vietnam (November)
2007 Belize (March), Kazakhstan (June), Ghana, Jamaica (October), Sri Lanka
(November), Gabon (December)
2008 Georgia (June)
2011 Jordan (January), Senegal (May), Lithuania, Namibia (November)
Notes — This table lists the sources of the sovereign bond yield data in the sample and the years in which
the respective time series are first observed (months in parentheses). If there are gaps in the Bloomberg
10-year generic yield series, we add observations of 10-year generic yields from Datastream, ensuring that
this does not induce structural breaks. Moreover, for some emerging countries we include 10-year generic
yields until the EMBI Global series become available.
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Table B.2: Rating changes, by region
Region Upgrades Downgrades
Caribbean 26 29
Central & Southwestern Asia 24 9
Central America 12 18
Central Europe 53 19
Eastern Asia 46 26
Eastern Europe 41 38
Middle East 61 24
North America 17 9
Northern Africa 5 14
Northern Asia 23 12
Northern Europe 23 14
Oceania 17 12
South America 108 77
Southeastern Asia 50 34
Southeastern Europe 55 32
Southern Asia 14 13
Southern Europe 28 54
Sub-Saharan Africa 23 10
Western Europe 9 18
635 462
Notes — This table shows the regional distribution of the sample of 1,097 upgrade and downgrade an-
nouncements made by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Regions are defined
based on the CIA World Factbook.
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Table B.3: Rating scales and transformation
Characterisation of debt
and issuer
Letter rating Linear
transformation
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Highest quality
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
AAA Aaa AAA 17
High quality
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16
AAA Aa2 AA 15
AA– Aa3 AA– 14
Strong payment capacity
A+ A1 A+ 13
A A2 A 12
A– A3 A– 11
Adequate payment capacity
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10
BBB Baa2 BBB 9
BBB– Baa3 BBB– 8
Likely to fulfil obligations,
ongoing uncertainty
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
gr
ad
e
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7
BB Ba2 BB 6
BB– Ba3 BB– 5
High credit risk
B+ B1 B+ 4
B B2 B 3
B– B3 B– 2
Very high credit risk
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC– Caa3 CCC–
Near default with
possibility of recovery
CC Ca CC 1
C
Default
SD C DDD
D DD
D
Notes — This table shows how the letter ratings used by Standard & Poor’s S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch
correspond to one another and to different degrees of credit risk, and how they are mapped into the linear
17-notch scale used in the investigation. The transformation is the same as in Afonso et al. (2012), from
which this table is adapted.
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Table B.5: Baseline regressions — Pooling all rating changes
LARGE 0.0102
(0.0064)
LARGE × Down 0.0178**
(0.0087)
InitRat -0.0012
(0.0008)
InitRat × Down -0.0005
(0.0009)
∆InitRat -0.0005
(0.0006)
∆InitRat × Down 0.0012
(0.0008)
OnWatch -0.0023
(0.0056)
OnWatch × Down -0.0153*
(0.0078)
SimActsWdwEvt -0.0036
(0.0053)
SimActsWdwEvt × Down 0.0206**
(0.0082)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.0935*
(0.0541)
SimActsDayNonEvt × Down 0.0598
(0.0849)
VIX -0.0001
(0.0004)
VIX × Down 0.0008**
(0.0004)
Down -0.0217
(0.0141)
N 51,881
Event countries 104
Non-event countries 73
Rating actions 1,022
R2 0.0183
Notes — This table shows regressions based on the full baseline specification (see column (3) in Table 2.1)
after pooling 635 upgrades and 462 downgrades made by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch between
1994 and 2011. For reasons of comparability, the dependent variable equals ∆Spread for downgrades,
and -∆Spread for upgrades. Down is a dummy variable taking on a value of one for downgrades, and
zero otherwise. The interaction term LARGE × Down indicates that there is a statistically significant
difference between the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
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Table B.8: Spillover channels, downgrades — Different trade measures
Trade measure
ExpImpEvt TradeImpEvt ExpShEvt TradeShEvt
LARGE 0.0244*** 0.0246*** 0.0244*** 0.0246***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
InitRat -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0030
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
∆InitRat 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
OnWatch -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060)
SimActsWdwEvt 0.0141** 0.0145** 0.0141** 0.0145**
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.1136* 0.1129* 0.1137* 0.1129*
(0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619)
VIX 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Region 0.0348** 0.0324* 0.0345** 0.0326*
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167)
TradeBloc 0.0120 0.0139 0.0118 0.0139
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Trade measure 0.0580 0.0517 0.0298 0.0247
(0.2268) (0.1143) (0.0659) (0.0538)
CapOpenEvt 0.0126** 0.0131** 0.0127** 0.0131**
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
CapOpenNonEvt 0.0081 0.0088 0.0081 0.0088
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0089)
SizeEvt 0.0247 0.0259 0.0244 0.0258
(0.0330) (0.0333) (0.0330) (0.0332)
∆Size -0.0146 -0.0187 -0.0144 -0.0186
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0255)
∆TrendGrowth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 19,724 19,511 19,715 19,502
Event countries 79 79 79 79
Non-event countries 70 70 70 70
Downgrades 405 405 405 405
R2 0.0434 0.0435 0.0434 0.0435
Notes — This table shows the robustness of our results on the spillover channels of downgrade announce-
ments to different measures of bilateral trade linkages. For purposes of comparison, we first report the
results from the most comprehensive specification using ExpImpEvt, the non-event country’s exports to
the event country relative to non-event country GDP (see column (7) in Table 2.3). Alternatively, we use
TradeImpEvt, which is bilateral trade (imports + exports) with the event country relative to non-event
country GDP. Finally, ExpShEvt and TradeShEvt measure the event country’s share in the non-event
country’s total exports and total bilateral trade, respectively.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of rating changes, by agency
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes by agency, measured on a
17-notch scale (see Table B.3). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635
upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and
2011.
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Table C.1: Borrower countries in the estimation sample
Country Number of deals Country Number of deals
China 688 Kuwait 17
Indonesia 557 Ghana 16
Brazil 491 Oman 16
Thailand 455 Morocco 15
India 421 Côte d’Ivoire 14
Mexico 375 Angola 12
Malaysia 263 Guatemala 12
Russia 251 Bahamas 11
Philippines 213 Cyprus 10
Chile 211 Estonia 9
Argentina 199 Jordan 9
Turkey 138 Bulgaria 8
Venezuela 101 Papua New Guinea 8
Saudi Arabia 93 Uruguay 8
Colombia 81 Zimbabwe 8
Poland 78 El Salvador 7
Hungary 77 Zambia 7
United Arab Emirates 72 Iran 6
Pakistan 71 Sri Lanka 6
Czech Republic 65 Trinidad and Tobago 6
South Africa 62 Dominican Republic 5
Nigeria 51 Ecuador 5
Slovak Republic 44 Mali 5
Peru 43 Lithuania 4
Egypt 39 Mauritius 4
Vietnam 37 Kenya 3
Croatia 31 Bangladesh 2
Ukraine 27 Cameroon 2
Bahrain 22 Costa Rica 2
Qatar 21 Lao PDR 2
Tunisia 19 Bolivia 1
Algeria 18 Guinea 1
Kazakhstan 18 Latvia 1
Panama 18 Lebanon 1
Notes — This table shows the 68 emerging and developing countries in the estimation sample used for both
the aggregate and micro-level analysis, including the total number of deals considered for each country.
The numbers refer to deals that directly enter the regressions. They are therefore net of the first five deals
in each country that determine early or late-participant status.
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Table C.3: Sensitivity of deal-variable distributions to the business cycle
Variable Mean 10th pct 25th pct 50th pct 75th pct 90th pct
Deal value -4.3521 -4.2800 -3.5685 -0.0864 1.9282
(0.1901) (0.1887) (0.2966) (0.9857) (0.7366)
Deal maturity 0.0162 0.0081 0.0422 0.0441 0.0547
(0.7213) (0.8562) (0.3160) (0.3373) (0.1992)
Deal spread 0.2197 -0.4631 -1.7058 -3.0034 -5.5295
(0.8510) (0.6888) (0.2379) (0.1064) (0.1336)
Deal in reserve -0.0017
currency (0.1499)
Notes — This table shows the coefficients on ∆GDP in regressions with the stated mean (for the binary
reserve-currency variable) or percentiles (for the continuous variables deal value, deal maturity, and deal
spread) as dependent variables. The mean and percentiles of the respective variables obtain by collapsing
and summarising the 5,593 deals from the estimation sample at the country-year level. To capture the
sensitivity of deal-variable distributions to the business cycle within countries, I then use the fixed-effects
estimator on the resulting unbalanced panel of 793 country-year observations, including year dummies to
account for global factors that affect deal-variable distributions across all countries equally. P-values based
on robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent
levels, respectively.
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